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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three related but fundamentally
distinct parts. They will be summarized separately.
"Physicalism and Reduction" argues that it is useful and
historically plausible to consider the physicalist program in the
philosophy of mind as the attempt to show that all nomic proper-
ties are physical properties. (Nomic properties are those
mentioned in the laws of any science.) Three more familiar doctrines
can be seen to derive from this broad definition. Inter-theoretic
reduction is in part an attempt to show that the properties mentioned
in, for example, psychological law are coextensive with physical
properties, and hence dispensible from science. The mind-body
identity theory, as originally formulated, is just the claim that the
psychological properties are (identical to) physical properties.
Logical behaviorism can be understood as an attempt to show,
without inter-theoretic reduction, that the putatively mental pro-
perties of psychology are physical properties because the predicates
ascribing psychological properties are synonymous with predicates
ascribing physical properties. These three are all shown to be
quite different from the more modest claim that all events are
physical events. These distinctions from the historical background
for Fodor's new model of the relationship of the sciences, which
in turn permits rigorous formulation and support for anti-reductionist
theses common in the literature.
"Dennett on Intentionality" argues that D. C. Dennett's attempt
to give a reductionistic, neurological account of intentionality is a
failure. The notion of reduction Dennett suggests is too weak to
eliminate intentional states or properties from psychology. His
argument to the effect that intentional psychology is non-empirical
or fictional is shown to contain serious errors, and, even if sound,
to fail to demonstrate that there is some distinctive problem with
intentional psychology that does not pertain to other special sciences.
His argument that intentional psychology is question-begging is shown
to rest on the familiar and illicit inference from the denial of substance
dualism to the assertion that there must be reductionist accounts of
mental states. It is suggested that Quine's more radical strategy of
accepting the irreducibility of intentionality yet denying it scientific
status (ultimately by reason of indetermincy) is perhaps now the only
move a true physicalist can make.
"Other Minds and the Argument from Analogy" argues that those
who use the argument from analogy in fact accept the basic portrait
of mental states propounded by other minds skeptics. It is suggested
that the dissaffection with the argument from analogy lies just in that
acceptance of a dubious theory of our knowledge of the mental states
of others. Some typical skeptical arguments about privacy and obser-
vation are examined and rejected. Strawson's thesis that behavior is
an intersubjectively available appearance of a mental state is favorably
received and augmented with an argument to the effect that if mental
states are not observable neither are many of the states which com-
prise animate behavior. A limited privacy of sense gualia is upheld,
but the skeptical portrait of mental states in general is rejected.
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PHYSICALISM AND REDUCTION
What is Physicalism? Preliminary Characterization
Physicalism is perhaps best understood as a family of
related (and sometimes obscurely related) claims and arguments.
In works on physicalism or on issues said to bear on the truth or
falsity of physicalism, one finds discussions and claims about
ontology, the unity of the sciences, mechanism, teleology, vital
forces, organic wholes, irreducible properties, identity, ex-
planation, the nature of psychology, the meaning of psychological
predicates, the future of science, et al. It is not my intent to
unravel all the issues and display their proper relationship (or
lack thereof). I wish to consider three specific theses:
(A) Let Mi be a mental state; let P range over
physical states. Then, for every Mi
(x) [if x is a token of Mi, then (3 P)('- y)
(y is a token of P and x = y)l 1
(B) For every mental state Mi there is a physical
state Pi such that state Mi is identical to physical
state Pi.
(C) Psychology is reducible to neurology.
Some Basic Clarifications
(A) and (B) are two quite distinct versions of an identity
theory of mind and body. (A) asserts the identity of the events
which are tokens of various state types, whereas (B) asserts the
identity of certain states. That is, (A) asserts that when a
particular organism is in some particular mental state at time ti ,
the having of this mental state Mi at t i is an event which is the
organism's being in some physical state or other. (B) asserts
something much stronger, viz., that Mi and Pi are the same state.
It does not assert that to say of something that it is in state Mi is
8synonymous with saying that it is in state Pi, but that the property
denoted by 'Mi' is the property denoted by 'Pi'. Thus the essential
difference between (A) and (B) is that (B) requires the identity of
the denotatum of every universal or type term of mental states with
the denotatum of some universal or type term of physical states.
(A) can be read as asserting that all events are physical events,
whereas (B) asserts that for every mental type predicate such as
'... . is in state Mi! there is a physical type predicate '. .. is in
state Pi' such that both predicates ascribe the same property.
Hence (B) asserts that there are no properties which are non-
physical because they are mental. Or, to state it positively, (B)
says that all properties used to characterize mental states and
events are physical properties.
Which properties are physical properties ? Let us begin by
noticing that on the strictest interpretation, physical properties
are those used in the laws of physics (or some standard formulation
thereof). But this seems unduly restrictive, for it is quite possible
that what many would call a physicalistic account of mental events
and behavior could obtain without the state types of the relevant
science being state types of physics. Therefore let us provisionally
take 'physical property' to mean 'property used to define a state
type present in the laws of any of the sciences of the inorganic and
biology. '
Which properties are mental properties? A workable answer
is those properties mentioned in the laws of psychology (including
psycho-physiology), and mentioned in the laws of no other science.
With this criterion we can reformulate (B) as
(B') All nomic properties of psychology are
physical properties
9There may be other criteria than nomicity in psychology for
determining which are the mental properties, but I prefer this
one because it is clear and because it generates a realistic goal
for physicalism. The demonstration of (B') would be a remark-
able achievement, not one that should be dismissed on the grounds
that some non-nomic mental properties had not been shown to be
physical properties.
Since properties are difficult to inspect, let us turn our
attention to predicates. Let us say that a predicate is nomic
if it occurs in some good formulation of the laws of some science.
The special sciences can be roughly distinguished by the families
of nomic predicates they use. (We have to say 'roughly' because
we cannot differentiate laws, theories, and scientific domains by
predicates alone. For example, identity relations make it diffi-
f
cult to differentiate laws properly: are E = hv and E = hU indeed
two different laws because the predicates are distinct? It hardly
seems likely, for frequency ane wave length are not the same
property. 2 This problem in differentiating laws with predicates
migrates to the problem of differentiating theories and domains
as well, if we attempt (as seems reasonable) to differentiate
domains by the theories, and theories by the laws they contain.
And additional difficulties arise: many laws and predicates are
used by more than one special science, as in the use of what we
usually call the laws of physics by chemistry. Nonetheless, we
do have some usable intuitions. No one is going to think that '..
believes that p' is prima facie a nomic predicate of physics or
chemistry.) If we have some notion of which are the predicates
of psychology we can say that those predicates which are nomic in
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psychology and not elsewhere are the mental predicates. Then
(B') can be reformulated as
(B") All nomic predicates of psychology denote
physical properties
Now thesis (B") has a task which (A) does not. It must
attempt to show that all the mentalistic predicates (such as 'believes
that p') which, as seems likely, will be nomic predicates of psycho-
logy, denote physical properties. To prove (B") one must show that
the prima facie distinctness of mental predicates (e. g., the fact that
only mental predicates are intentional) is not reason to believe that
the properties denoted by these predicates are non-physical pro-
perties. The physicalist must show that all such predicates denote
physical properties; I wish to call this program the physicalization
of mentalistic predicates. It should be obvious that neither inten-
tional nor phenomenal predicates appear to denote physical proper-
ties and hence that special account of them is owed us by physicalism.
It might well be thought that (A) will ultimately entail (B')
and (B"). For it is at least plausible to follow Brandt and Kim's
suggestion (Brandt & Kim, 1967) that we define an event token as
the instancing of a property at a certain time and at a certain place.
In this case, an event token identity thesis for mental and physical
events will be stated as the generalization of the schema
(1) (M i , t i , Li) = (Pj, tj, Lj) iff. L i = L
ti = tj
M =- Pj
where Ln are locations, tn are times, and Mn are mental properties
and Pn are physical properties. But this criterion of event identity
runs into trouble even before one comes to the mind-body identity
11
theory. We usually think, for example, of the battle between the
Monitor and the Merrimack as an event. But it instances many
properties: it was the first battle of iron-clad ships and it was
a sea-battle off the coast of Virginia, etc. Are we to say that
in fact many events occurred in the same place at the same time ?
This is a hard line to follow, for we will then be forced to say that
what we thought was one event was in fact as many events as there
are properties true of it and that infinitely many events can occur
in the same place at the same time. Brandt and Kim's criterion
of event identity is most counterintuitive when we consider acts
or behaviors (the sort of events psychological theory will discuss):
where we would normally say that a rat's choosing the third object
of a set is an event which may itself have many properties, such
as being the choice of an object which is white, being the seven-
teenth such choice done that day, being the rat's mental state at
three o'clock, or being what the rat thought would get a reward,
Brandt and Kim will presumably have to say that the instancing of
each of these properties is a different event. But then this token
of the choosing of an object which is the third member of a set is
not the same event token as the choosing of the white object, and
not is the same event token as the choosing of what the rat thought
would get a reward, and so on. Does this mean that the rat has
performed as many acts as there are properties true of the choice ?
We more naturally think of the animal as having done one thing, but
that this act has many properties. Event (or act) individuation by
property individuation is much more finely grained than our ordinary
notion of event or act individuation. Brandt and Kim admit that their
individuation of events by properties is "strong" (p. 215), and that
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they have used it in formulating the identity theory because any
weaker formulations "leaves unresolved most of the puzzles
about the relation of mind and body that have agitated philosophers
historically (p. 216). This claim has some justification, but it
certainly seems wiser to differentiate property and event identity
theses. An event identity theory would presumably prevent a
dualism of substances, which has traditionally been the major
worry. And in any case, we want to determine which forms of
physicalism are true, which not, and in what relations they stand.
It is self-defeating to formulate the criterion of event identity to
fit the needs of mind-body identity theory. At least as a first step,
one wants to see whether or not mental events (both types and tokens)
can coherently and perhaps truly be said to be identical on some
reconstrual of our ordinary notions of event identity. Assuming
that Leibniz' Law is true, an event typ claim implies the property
identity claim, without our having to employ an unlikely theory of
event individuation.
Since property individuation is more finely grained than
event individuation, we should say that one and the same event
will include the instancing of many properties. And it is entirely
possible that it will instance more than one nomic property, where
a nomic property is one mentioned in the laws of any science. And
if one of the nomic properties is not a physical property, (A) could
be true and (B') false. Another way of putting the same point is to
note that (A) presumably entails that all events are physical events.
If, as seems reasonable, we assume the generality of physics--
i. e., that every event has a nomological deductive explanation
using only the laws of physics--, then every event must instance
a nomic physical property. But it is entirely consistent with this
claim that some events instance nomic non-physical properties
as well. Thus the two physicalist theses (A) and (B') differ in a
way which pertains not just to ontology but, as we shall see, to
the structure of science as well.
Nomic Properties and Predicates
Since an event may instantiate more than one nomic property,
events will cross classify into different nomic classes (a nomic
class is all those events possessing one and the same nomic pro-
perty). For example, one and the same functional state might be
instantiated by entities with very different neurophysiologies or
electronics. That is, functional state F might be instantiated by
entity X when it was in neurological state N and by entity Y when
it was in 'electronic' state E; the states F, N, and E are not co-
extensive. 4 Similarly, there might be no property nomic in physics
and coextensive with a given mental property. In fact, if (A) is true,
and if physics is complete in the sense that all event tokens instance
a nomic property of physics, and if we have no further constraints
on the relation of mental and physical properties, every M1 event
might instance a different nomic physical property. The most we
can infer from the completeness of physics and (A) is
(2) (x) (Mlx iff. (Px P 2 x v P 3 x . . * ))
where Pl, P 2 , etc. are nomic physical predicates (each denoting
a nomic physical property), where x ranges over events, and where
M1 is a nomic mental property. But why can we not say that (2)
contains in fact a constructed or complex predicate, viz.,
(P1 v P 2 v P 3 " )
which we call P1 * and which denotes a nomic physical property? 5
The difficulty with this apparently unproblematic strategy
can be seen if we consider these constructed predicates in greater
detail. We have, let us assume, a law of psychology which relates
two mental properties. The exact nature of this law is unimportant
so let us express it schematically as
(M I ) - -- (M2)6
Let us assume that M I is coextensive with a disjunction of physical
predicates, as is M 2. Let us designate the disjunction coextensive
with M 1 as (P 1 v P 2 v P 3 . .) 7. Let us designate the disjunction
coextensive with M 2 as (Pl' iv P 2 ' 3 ' . . . ). Now P1, P 2 , P 3.
P"1 P 2 ' are all nomic predicates. That is, there is a law-like
statement relating P 1 with P1' (let us say), and P 2 with P2 ', etc.
(If this were not the case, (Ml) --- (M 2 ) would express a law which
was not expressed in physical predicates. ) What we have, then, is
the following situation:
(M I ) --- (M 2 )
(M I) iff. (P 1 vP 2 vP 3
(M 2 ) iff. (P 1' v P 2 ' vP 3 ' )
(Pl) --- (P1')
(P2) 
--- (P2')
etc.
We have defined
(P 1 *) = (P 1 vP 2 v P 3 .
Now, finally, the question is, can we conclude from this that
there is a scientific law
(P 1*) --- (P 2 )?
In the first place, it doesn't follow from the fact that
(MI ) --- (M2 )
is a law and the true biconditionals
Ml iff. P1*
and
M 2 iff. P2*
that
(P 1 *) --- (P 2 *) is a law. For law-likeness is not
preserved in what is implied truth functionally by the conjunction
of a law and non-law-like but true statements. For example, if
it is a law that all rational creatures have large brains, and true
that all creatures with large brains have two legs, it does not follow
that it is a law that all rational creatures have two legs.
But then can we consider Pl* nomic because each of its dis-
juncts is nomically related to one of the disjuncts of P 2 * ? The
answer is almost surely No. The disjunction of predicates
(P1 v P 2 v P 3 . . .) is seriously heterogeneous. It includes pre-
dicates not only of neurology but electronics as well. And what we
know of these fields suggests that one and the same mental state
may be instantiated by neurologically or electronically type distinct
events. For example, the state of remembering that '2 + 2 = 4'
may well be instantiated by neurologically distinct events each time
it occurs; Lashley's principle of equipotentiality implies as much.
The electronic variability of computer systems is obvious enough,
for one and the same computation state may be instantiated by
computers in different physical states.
But the problems with (P1 *) have just begun. Since
is supposed to be a law, each disjunction must comprise not only
those states which are in fact instantiated when M1 or M2 is, but
also all those states which are nomologically possible co-instarltiators
with M1 or M2 , respectively. The disjunctions must include, then,
not only the states which are instantiated by the creatures and
machines we know, but also all the states which could in some
nomologically possible universe be the neurology-like states in-
stantiated when M1 or M 2 are. As Fodor has suggested following
Davidson (Fodor, 1974), the most rational assumption is that a
disjunction like (P 1 v P 2 v P 3 . . .) is susceptible only to brute
enumeration; and sufficiently heterogeneous that no amount of
enumeration would suffice to convince us that we had indeed enumerated
all of Plj. We are convinced that the relevant properties exist be-
cause we are convinced of the completeness of physics and the
modest demands of event token identity theory. But there would
be no general method for determining which .P i was instantiated
during any M1 event.
If Pl* is the sort of predicate just described, it seems
immensely unlikely that it could be a nomic predicate. Scientific
laws typically are expressed in predicates which pick out what Fodor
has called "natural kinds" (Fodor, 1974, p. 7). Disjunctive predi-
cates do not typically pick out such natural kinds. We quite
naturally think that 'irradiation of green plants by sunlight causes
carbohydrate synthesis' is a law and that 'freezing causes the
destruction of protoplasm' is a law, but not that '(irradiation of
green plants or freezing) causes (carbohydrate synthesis or the
destruction of protoplasm)' is a law. 8 We tend to think that 'all
emeralds are green' is law, whereas 'all emeralds are grue' is
not. 9 Since P c* ontains a probably infinite disjunction of hetero-
i- I
geneous terms, its status seems even more dubious than, say,
'irradiation of green plants or freezing'. It seems very unlikely
indeed that such a predicate would turn out to be a nomic predicate.
A constructed predicate like Pl* would be nomic only if we
could find a law
(P 1 ) - - (P 2 *)
Of course it is always possible that a new scientific theory would
supply such a law; but it is equally possible that the only nomic
class of the P 1 * events is precisely the M1 class. Or in other
words, there may be psychological laws whose nomic classes are
not coextensive with the nomic classes of physical law. Or, more
positively, there are laws of psychology which are not expressed
in, nor derivable from the laws of any other science. We have
special sciences precisely because we want to find the laws that
we can, not just those of physics. Constructed predicates would
obliterate the differentiation of the sciences which the polynomicity
of events permits. And to no end, for all events are already covered
by physics.
Some Fundamental Confusions
Token and type physicalism have not, until recently, been
distinguished. The cost of this oversight will become clear as
we proceed. Another failure of discrimination, one which is more
readily apparent, permeates the writings of many modern physi-
calists (and identity theorists). Even in careful works we find a
failure to distinguish between an ontological thedis--type or token
physicalism, or some thesis which is vague as to this distinction--
and a thesis about the explanation of mental or behavioral events.
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For example, we find the following pairs of claims made together
without any expression of how distinct the one member is from the
other:
(1) a. "There does seem to be, so far as science is
concc:rned, nothing in the world but increasingly
complex arrangements of physical constituents. "
(Smart, 1962, p. 34)
b. ". . . even the behavior of man himself will
one day be explicable in mechanistic terms."
(Smart, ibid. )
(2) a. ". . . materialism. . . assumes that the only
entities existing in the world are atoms, aggregates
of atoms, and the relations between such aggregates."
(Feyerabend, 1963, p. 83)
b. Materialism can give us a "correct account" of
human behavior. (Feyerabend, ibid. )
(And similarly, Feigl, who never gives a clear statement of his
version of the identity theory does manage to claim that "normal
inductive extrapolation from the successes of psychophysiology
to date make it plausible that an adequate theory of animal and
human behavior can be provided on a neurophysiological basis"
(Feigl, 1956a, p. 382) in an article which is generally taken as
one of the seminal works of the identity theory. ) I think it fair,
then, to say that at least some of the original identity theorists
confused their ontological thesis with some other thesis, one
which deals with the explanation of mind and animate behavior.
This thesis has no constant form, as should be clear from the
quotes above. I wish to abstract (or construct) one thesis which
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asserts at least a good deal of what the varying claims express,
and is relatively clear, plausible and decidable. The best I can
do is thesis
(C) Psychology is reducible to neurology.
How is it that claims apparently so disparate as ((A) or (B))
and (C) are confused or seem to stand in some obvious logical
relation, a relation apparently so evident that most authors don't
even trouble to state it? A plausible answer, an answer that has
some historical justification is that the possible falsity of (A) or
(B) was seen as the only likely reason for thinking that (C) might
not be true. It is a commonplace today to take physicalism as
simply an ontological thesis. But the traditional breadth of dis-
cussion hardly seems to be captured in this one claim. And
before the rise of modern identity theory in the 1950's physicalists
commonly claimed that a thesis such as (C) was in fact the funda-
mental claim of physicalism. In 1939, Feigl stated that " physi-
calism in the strict sense" assert s "the potential derivability of
all scientific laws from the laws of physics" (Feigl, 1939, p. 382,
his emphasis); no mention is made of an ontological thesis. In
1963 Feigl stated that the unity of science thesis espoused by the
Vienna circle consisted in (or can now be seen to consist in) two
theses: (1) the "unity of the language of science" (usually taken
to mean that there is some universal criterion of empirical
meaningfulness) (1963, p. 227) and (2) "the facts and laws of the
natural and social sciences can be derived--at least in principle--
from the theoretical assumption of physics" (1963, p. 228) or
(2') "the facts and laws of mental life can be given a 'physical'
explanation, .. ." (1963, p. 242). In sum, "physicalism amounts
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to a monistic view of scientific explanation, and therefore--
in a sense--also of the universe." (p. 266) (It is to be noted
that Carnap, in commenting on this article now admits that
the second thesis of physicalism is not "firmly established know-
ledge but /a/ sweeping extrapolating hypothesis" (Carnap, 1963,
p. 883).
Whatever the historical relationship may be, it is more
important now to determine the relationships which hold among
(A), (B), and (C). What we shall see is that (B)- -or a thesis
identical to (B) except that M i and Pi are said to be nomically
coextensive rather than identical--is a necessary condition for
(C), and is, from the standpoint of our present ignorance of both
psychology and neurology, the only formally necessary condition
for (C) about which there is a clear doubt. (A), it will turn out,
cannot carry the weight the (B) or even its weak sister (bicondi-
tional) claim can in a proof of (C). Thus it might well turn out
that (A) is true, that token ontological physicalism is true, but
(B) and (C) are not. To demonstrate these points we must discuss
reduction.
Reduction
Traditional physicalist portraits suggest a hierarchy of
the sciences. But there are two conflicting interpretations of
this image. One is of a hierarchy where disciplines are differ-
entiated by the different laws and theories (and theoretical en-
tities) they discover. Of course, the special sciences must be
closely related if Science is to be that unified explanation of Being
which was desired. The unity is provided by suitable relationship
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of the laws of the various special sciences. But if 'suitable
relationship' and 'unity' are interpreted in plausibly strict ways,
the hierarchy collapses, for all the laws are shown to be laws
of physics or logically derivable form the laws of physics with
the addition of certain definitions or definition-like statements.
Then the hierarchy telescopes into physics; or more precisely,
the hierarchy is seen to be essentially pragmatic. And this is
the second interpretation of the physicalist image of the relation-
ship of the sciences. The interpretations conflict; the image is
unstable. To understand traditional claims about the unity of
science clearly, we must examine the relationship of the laws
and theories of the various sciences--what is commonly called
the problem of reduction.
I will use E. Nagel's model of reduction as the standard
model of reduction because it is more complete, e. g., in its
discussion of the informal conditions a putative reduction must
meet in order to be a useful scientific advance and in it s discussion
of definition relationships; and because other, superficially less
stringent models are forced to introduce essentially the same
principles Nagel states explicitly, and introduce a bit of confusion
as well.
Nagel maintains that
A reduction is effected when the experimental
laws (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory
as well) /of the secondary science/ are shown to
be the logical consequences of the theoretical
assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating defini-
tions) of the primary science.
(Nagel, 1961, p. 352)
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If the secondary science contains terms which do not occur in
the primary science, and if 'A' is such a term, then there must
be "suitable relations between what is signified by 'A' and traits
represented by theoretical terms already present in the primary
science." (Nagel, 1961, p. 353)
But now what precisely is this "suitable relation"? What
precisely are the "coordinating definitions"'? Nagel suggests
three possibilities. One is "logical connection" in which 'A' is
shown to be synonymous with or implied by theoretical terms of
the primary science. The second is "convention", where by de-
cision we connect 'A' with theoretical terms of the primary science.
And third, "factual or material connection" in which
asserting that the occurrence of the state of
affairs signified by a certain theoretical ex-
pression 'B' in the primary science is a
sufficient (or necessary and sufficient) condition
for the state of affairs designated by 'A'. It
will be evident that in this case independent
evidence must in principle be obtainable for the
occurrence of each of the two states of affairs,
so that the expressions designating the two states
must have identifiably different meanings.
(pp. 354-355)
Deciding between the second and third can be difficult. In the
case of thermodynamics and the condition of connectability which
identifies temperature with mean kinetic energy, we might want
to say that this is by convention if the only experimental procedure
statistical mechanics had for determining kinetic energy were
temperature measurements. It would be the third if we have
other connections between the two theories (pp. 356-357).
One point of Nagel's portrait of reduction is vague. He fails
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to specify clearly that in his model the "factual or material
connection" is a law-like statement. The more common name
for these "conditions of connectability" is 'bridge-laws' and
that term expresses the matter better. For the difference
between the standard model described by Nagel and that suggested
by Fodor (PFodor, 1974) can be understood to lie just in this,
that the disjunctive, reduction-like statements of Fodor's model
are not law-like, whereas those of Nagel's are.
In addition to these formal conditions for reduction, there
are also informal conditions, such as whether (i) the reduction
makes possible a unification of the apparently unrelated laws of
the secondary science, e. g., the way the kinetic theory of gases
can relate the second law of thermodynamics and the Boyle-
Charles law; (ii) the reducing theory explains the limit conditions
or numerical constants of the reduced theory; and (iii) whether
the reducing theory allows for less restrictive formulations of
the laws of the reduced theory (or even new laws), e. g., as the
kinetic theory of gases can formulate gas laws for non-ideal gases
(Nagel, 1961, pp. 358-360). Nagel takes these informal conditions
quite seriously:
for a reduction to mark a significant intellectual
advance, it is not enough that previously estab-
lished laws of the secondary science be represented
within the theory of the primary discipline. The
theory must also be fertile in usable suggestions
for developing the secondary science, and must
yield theorems referring to the latter's subject
matter which augment or correct its currently
accepted body of laws. (p. 360)
One can certainly appreciate Nagel's informal conditions
from a scientific standpoint. A merely formal reduction of
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psychology to neurology would be of no use either to psychologists
or neurologists. Yet in this particular case, even a formal re-
duction would be of importance because it would prove (C) "in
principle", which is all the philosophical physicalist need worry
about. If it could be demonstrated that psychology is not now
reducible to neurology and that there are reasons for believing
that it will never be reducible, then (C) is false. 10
Therefore let us return to the formal conditions. Other
models of reduction have a principle similar to Nagel's conditions
of connectability. This is not immediately apparent. Oppenheim
and Putnam define reduction thusly: If T 1, T 2 , . . . T 1 are
theories, T2 is reduced to T 1 iff.
(1) "The vocabulary of T2 contains terms not in the
vocabulary of T 1.i
(2) "Any observational data explainable by T 2 are
explainable by T1. "
(3) "T 1 is at least as well systematized as T2 " (i. e.,
"the 'ration' . . . of simplicity to explanatory
power should be at least as great in the case of
the reducing theory as in the case of the reduced
theory")
(Oppenheim & Putnam, 1956, p. 5)
A branch of science (i. e., a special science) B2 reduces to
another branch iff. at time t, all the theories of B2 are reduced
to theories of B131. Now note that this sense of reduction does not
require bridge laws connecting the distinctive properties of the
laws of the secondary science with nomic properties of the primary
science. Two theories could, on Oppenheith and Putnam's account,
stand in a relatnship of reduction even if no such bridge laws were
obtainable: thermodynamics could reduce to statistical mechanics
even if it were the case that temperature and mean kinetic energy
were not related by a bridge law. In fact a mnentalistic theory of
behavior could be said to reduce to a strictly behavioristic theory
if they explained the same things and if the behavioristic theory
was just a bit more systematized than the mentalistic one. This
reduction would hold despite the lack of any specifiable logical
relation between the properties, or states, of the two theories.
But then this account fails to tell us how we would insure that
indeed the two theories explain "the same things. " Without
bridge laws, the reduced theory might ascribe properties and
use predicates not present in the reducing theory; and thus the
laws of the secondary science cannot be derived from those of
the primary science. If specific laws cannot be derived, it is
difficult to see in what sense reduction, rather than replacement
by a different theory has been accomplished. The Oppenheim-
Putnam model of reduction does not give us a way of distinguishing
replacement from reduction. Surely a model of reduction should
do this. 'Reduction' by replacement may indeed describe an in-
teresting transformation of theories in the sciences, for example,
the replacement of the phlogiston theory of heat with the kinetic
theory. In a loose sense, the two theories are dealing with the
"same things. " But this reduction and this sense of 'same things'
is not that of the canonical case, the reduction of thermodynamics
to statistical mechanics. It is possible that we will come to regard
mental states as we now regard phlogiston. But given that there
are mental states and laws thereof, reduction by replacement
leaves unanswered the question that now most wants answering,
viz., how are psychology and neurology related?
It is the looseness of this reduction by replacement, I
think, which leads Oppenheim and Putnam to emphasize another
notion of reduction, namely micro-reduction. "B 2 micro-reduces
to B1 iff. B2 is reduced to Bl; and the objects in the universe of
discourse of B2 are wholes which possess a decomposition into
proper parts all of which belong to the universe of Bl" (p. 6).
This is both stronger and more obscure than Nagel' s formulation
of inter-theoretic reduction. Nagel's conditions of connectability
require only that there be definition relations of some sort between
the terms of B1 and B2 , not that the things referred to stand in the
'Pt' relation. Oppenheim and Putnam's micro-reduction thesis
reads in a kind of atomism into the idea of reduction. Moreover,
it is not clear what this strict 'Pt' relation gives to reduction
programs: the 'Pt' relation may express something important
about the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics,
but why should we limit ourselves to such a narrow relation for
the reduction of biology to biochemistry or psychology to neurology?
And in any case, the 'pt' relation of entities does not seem to be
sufficient to generate the bridge laws which relate nomic properties
of the two fields; the 'pt' relation is not sufficient for reduction,
if the reduction of thermodynamics is taken as the paradigm case.
Yet Putnam and Oppenheim assert that micro-reduction is "the
only method of attaining unitary science that appears to be
seriously available at present" (p. 8) and that "when we come
S. to branches with different universes--say physics and
psychology--it seems clear that the possibility of reduction depends
on the existence of a structural connection between the universes
via the 'pt' relation" (ibid). (Of course, what may underlie their
" I
insistence on the 'pt' relation is the intuition that there must
be appropriate "structural connections" between the property
"universes" of the two fields, i. e., that there be some strong
connection of the states or properties mentioned in the laws of
the two disciplines. But the clearest form of such a view is
just the bridge-law thesis of Nagel's model. )
It is clear, then, that all adequate formulations of
reduction must use bridge laws or statements. For without
these, the laws of the secondary science cannot be derived as
laws (in the case of bridge laws) or cannot be derived at all (in
the case of bridge statements). A failure to find bridge laws
can be used to generate a clear definition of emergence:
The Boyle-Charles law cannot be deduced from
the assumptions of statistical mechanics unless
a postulate is added relating the term 'tempera-
ture' to the expression 'mean kinetic energy of
molecules'. This postulate cannot itself be
deduced from statistical mechanics in its
classical form; and this fact--that a postulate
(or something equivalent to it) must be added
to statistical mechanics as an independent
assumption if the gas laws are to be deduced--
illustrates what is perhaps the central thesis in
the doctrine of emergence. ...
(Nagel, 1961, p. 372)
Emergence in this sense, the non-existence of bridge laws,
implies the failure of reduction, though the converse does not
hold. To say that a certain property is emergent is to say that
a condition of connectability to some physical property does not
exist. Physicalism (B') or (B") obviously maintains that no
nomic property (or predicate) of psychology is emergent. Of
course, it is consistent with this claim that some psychological
properties are now emergent- -or perhaps we should say
'apparently emergent'. No current failure is sufficient to
guarantee the falsity of (B') or (B"). Nonetheless, there are
principled reasons for believing that at least some psychological
properties will (always) be emergent. And in any case, it is
rather unfair for physicalism to define itself in such a way that
it is not falsifiable. If physicalism is to be an empirical hypo-
thesis about the sciences, one must be willing to accept whatever
evidence there is about the emergence of psychological properties:
(B') may still be true, but it is at least worthwhile to see what
follows, empirically and philosophically, from the fact that it
may be false. 11
The Return to (A), (B), and (C)
Now we can play our trumps. Claim (B) is a general schema
for bridge laws between psychology and neurology. In fact, (B)
is stronger than any bridge law need be, for it asserts an identity
of properties, whereas a bridge law is only a law-like bicondi-
tional. Thus, ironically, if the identity claim (B) is used as a
premise for (C), it goes further than is needed for inter-theoretic
reduction; because (again) all one needs for the inter-theoretic
reduction claim is the thesis that every mental property is nomically
coextensive with a property of physical law. It is now hard to see
what motivated the insistence by the early identity theorists on
what in effect were property identity claims. The existence of
non-physical properties becomes a serious problem for physicalism
only when the idea that such properties are not even coectensive with
physical properties is seriously entertained--a possibility the early
identity theorists rejected on supposedly empirical grounds.12
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(A), it is important to note, is not a bridge-law. Even
though identity is a stronger relation than the nomic biconditional
necessary for reduction, (A) fails the reductionist because it
does not relate the appropriate, i. e., kind, terms of the two
sciences. (A) says only that every instance of a mental state
is an instance of some physical state or other, and a bridge law
must be stronger than that. Reduction requires law-like state-
ments which coordinate nomic terms of the two sciences. This
last point--that the coordinating definitions be law-like--seems
fairly obvious in discussions of reduction, but was commonly
overlooked in formulations of the identity theory or psycho-
physical parallelism. It is not sufficient for inter-theoretic
reduction that every instance of a mental state is an instance of
some brain state or other (i. e., some form of the (A) thesis).
What is required is that each mental state type be coordinate
with a nomic neurological type term specifiable within an adequate
neurological law or law-like generalization. If a term which
appears in any laws of the secondary science is not a physical
term, nor stands in at least a law-like biconditional relation to
any such term, then that term will designate an emergent psycho-
logical property. And in this case token physicalism (A) will be
true, though (B), (B'), and (C) will not. Differentiating (A) and
(B) allows us to determine whether there are emergent properties
in psychology without prejudicing us towards dualism.
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Other Confusions
(A) and (B) differ (in word at least) from the formulations
of identity theory one frequently encounters in the recent litera-
ture. There one finds that an identity claim is usually made
about 'raw feels' or sensations (Cf. Place, 1956; Smart, 1962;
Feigl, 1956) on the one side and brain processes on the other.
Why, we might well ask, are these formulations limited to
sensations or occurrent mental states? Why aren't desires,
beliefs, thoughts, etc. included? Presumably they too are
identical with brain processes, so why are they not included in
the formulations of the identity theory?
One reason for the limitation to occurrent mental states
seems to be the belief that an identity claim is most difficult to
prove in regard to occurrent mental states and that other types
of mental state will be covered by the claim, a fortiori. This
does have a certain intuitive force, for everyone has probably
experienced that sense of a chasm between electromagnetic
radiation, neurons, electro-chemical changes, etc., and the
experience of red.
But it is important to ask why did it appear to everyone
(objectors and defenders alike) that the strongest arguments
against identity theory turn on occurrent mental states. Or
alternatively, why did it appear to everyone that if identity theory
could prove its case with occurrent mental states, other mental
states would be covered, too? Were philosophers simply relying
on their intuition about the paramount difficulty of occurrent mental
states?
The answer to the last question seems to be an unequivocal
No., Most identity theorists have given reasons for believing
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that non-occurrent mental states need no consideration at all.
The basic reason is the rather startling claim that non-occurrent
mental states are not, in a proper scientific ontology, mental
states at all. They are, we are told, "dispositions to behave. "
The commitment by many identity theorists to some form of
behaviorism is undeniable.13 The importance of this point
cannot be overstressed. Logical behaviorism, if it were true,
would show that certain expressions which we take to be mental-
istic have the same meaning as expressions which clearly are
not mentalistic. For example, the property designated by
'. .. believes that p' is (so it was said) the same property as
that designated by '. . . has a disposition to behave in way Bp,
or is actually so behaving.' Since it was believed that dispositions
and behaviors were safely physical properties, these synonymy
relations were thought to demonstrate that mentalistic expression
in fact ascribed physical properties. But the behaviorist program
runs into serious trouble with mentalistic predicates like '...
sees a yellowish after-image', for this does not seem to mean
'. .. is in neurological state Ni'. The heart of the traditional
(type) identity theory is the claim that these two expressions,
though not synonymous, ascribe the same property (Brandt and
Kim, 1967, pp. 226-228). (Note that. a token identity thesis such
as (A), since it is a claim about event tokens, need not claim any
identity of properties. )
Now we can see why the special attention given to occurrent
mental states was well justified within the theoretical context the
identity theorists had constructed. Whereas predicates ascribing
non-occurrent mental states were said to be synonymous with
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some set of predicates ascribing physical states, predicates
which ascribe phenomenal or occurrent states were not con-
sidered synonymous with neurological predicates. Type identity
theory claims that the same property is ascribed even though the
mentalistic and physicalistic predicates are not synonymous.
And this claim was understood to have a much weaker status
than the behavioristic reductions of the intentional predicates.
The identity theory arose, then, as part of a more com-
prehensive plan, that of showing that all mental state types are
physical state types. But the state types are (probably) defined
by nomic properties, hence this larger plan is nothing other than
(B').
Identity theorists saw occurrent states and the predicates
ascribing them as the most difficult part of their general solution
to the mind/body problem. But now identity theorists and physi-
calists generally are faced with the failure of the logical be-
haviorist program. Sentences ascribing non-occurrent mental
states turn out not to be synonymous with sentences ascribing
behaviors and dispositions. The upshot for the general program
is just this, that it is back at ground zero, where all genuine mental
predicates suggest the existence of distinctively mental properties.
If anyone takes this general physicalist program seriously, he
must now begin again and see if there is any way to account for
whatever predicates (and properties) logical behaviorism was
thought to render unproblematic.
Now can an account based on a claim of same property
ascription by non-synonymous predicates satisfy the physicalist?
We saw above (pp. JO and 27) that the most general way to
characterize the physicalist program is to say the physicalism
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wants to show that the mentalistic predicates do not imply that
there are distinctively mental properties (See (B") p. lo . )
A type identity theory will, if true, surely accomplish this, but
it is doubtful that an event token identity theory even could. In
other words, if an identity claim like (A) is true and (B) false,
then the identity theory will not assert the identity of, nor the
coextensivity of nomic psychological and neurological properties.
And thus, event token identity theory will not demonstrate that
psychological properties are physical properties. Now if
physicalism amounts only (as is now often said) to an event token
identity thesis, then physicalism turns out to be a much weaker
thesis than it often presented itself to be, for token event identity,
though it is sufficient for denying any entity dualism, permits
emergent mental properties in psyc hology. This conclusion would
certainly displease some physicalists, who present physicalism
as asserting "a monistic view of explanation" (Feigl, 1963, p. 266),
or as asserting that "we can give a complete account of man in
purely physio-chemical terms" (Armstrong, 1965, p. 67). The
physicalist may wish to withdraw these claims, and at a minimum
admit that event token identity is consistent with their falsity.
And thus now we can see again the importance of the type/token
distinction applied to mental and physical states. As we saw above,
as long as it is believed that the ontological claim of physicalism is
a claim about the identity of nomic properties, the ontological thesis
(viz. (B)) removes what seems to be the only formal barrier to the
truth of the reduction thesis (C), for the identity statements are or
can be used as bridge laws. Once it is seen that there is a way of
putting the anti-dualist ontological claim which does not generate
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bridge laws, we have the very interesting possibility that an
ontological thesis may be true and the reduction claim false.
Theoretical Windfall
The relationship between different sciences' explanations
of behavior has been a focus of concern for some time. A
number of authors argue for vague and rather radical theses
about the relationship of psychology and the (presumptively)
physical sciences. Norman Malcolm has argued that neuro-
logical explanations are "no more basic" than those of psychology
(Malcolm, 1968). Charles Taylor has claimed, among other
things, "that the shape of developments in the cortex can them-
selves not be fully explained without reference to the /psycholo-
gical/ level, " (Taylor, 1970), thereby suggesting that neurology
must in some way be founded on psychology--a reversal of the
physicalist view. It is not my concern here to evaluate such
claims fully, but to show that their basic intent can be made
more clearly and with more warrant if we attend to the differ-
ences between the varieties of physicalism.
For clarity's sake, I shall focus entirely on the work of
Charles Taylor. Taylor has attempted to show that at least
some psychological laws are teleological in a way no law of
inanimate processes is and that experimental behaviorism has
been unsuccessful in its attempt to eliminate, reduce, or replace
such laws (Taylor, 1964). In "The Explanation of Purposive Be-
havior" (Taylor, 1970) he considers the claim that there might
be non-teleological neurological laws which would explain animate
behavior or to which psychological laws would reduce. But it
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turns out that some of his claims, which at first blush appear
to turn on teleology in fact do not require anything more than
the claim that psychological state types are not identical to
neurological states.
Taylor begins with what he calls the "thesis of expression"
To say that all thoughts, etc., must have a
neural expression is not necessarily to say
that a given thought has a characteristic neural
expression which always pertains to it whenever
it appears in the mind of any human being. The
expression thesis need involve no guarantee that
the criteria for identity of mental states will
parallel the criteria of identity of brain states.
What is required for the thesis, however, is that
there be no disembodied thought.
(p. 68)
The thesis that there is no disembodied thought is of course
weaker than even an event token identity theory; a substance
dualist could consistently maintain that no thoughts were in
fact disembodied. But the spirit of Taylor' s work is certainly
anti-dualist, and his earlier article "Mind-Body Identity: A
Side Issue?", explicitly propounds an event token identity theory. 14
Taylor then goes on to assert, and argue in a general sort
of way, for what certainly appear to be distinct claims: (aO'that
explanation by purpose is the appropriate model for human and
animal behavior" (p. 68), (b) "for this range of behavior /higher
animate behavior/, the key level of explanation is a psychological
one" (p. 72), (c) "that the shape of developments in the cortex
can themselves not be fully explained without reference to /the
psychological! level" (p. 72), (d) "for this range of behavior,
the most basic level of explanation is psychological" (p. 72) (my
emphases). Taylor argues that the thesis of expression does not
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entail the thesis which he variously expresses as (a), (b), (c),
or (d): "that tON .cc is no disembodied mental life tells us nothing
per se about the laws governing this life" (p. 73), and thus there
or
is no a priori reason to assume that (a), (b), (c), (d) is false (p.
73). Thus Taylor, in fact, was the first to assert what Fodor
was to present more rigorously, viz., that token event identity
does not entail reduction, and that there is no compelling argu-
ment, a priori or empirical, for the reduction of neurology to
psychology. What is lacking, however, in Taylor's work is a
clear statement of the relationship of psychology and neurology
(or explanations derived therefrom) and what sort of priority
psychological explanations have over neurological ones for the
explanation of animate behavior. It is by no means obvious
exactly what each of (a)-(d) asserts, nor, on plausible interpre-
tations, that they are even coextensively true. To say that
psychology is the appropriate level for the explanation of behavior
seems to be a merely pragmatic point, one that even a reductivist
could agree to. To say that neurological events cannot be fully
explained without reference to psychology seems to be a very
strong thesis indeed, stronger than the obscure claim that the
"key" level of explanation of some behavior is psychological.
With the type-token distinction and Fodor's model of re-
duction we can make Taylor's basic claim more precise and more
viable. We can simply say that there are nomic state types in
psychology which are not coextensive with nomic neurological
types. Then, instead of (a)-(d), with pragmatic "appropriateness"
or an unargued reverse reduction, or a vague "key level" thesis,
we have the claim that some psychological event types have, as
types, no nomological deductive explanation on the neurological
level. Psychological laws of behavior are basic, in this portrait,
in that they have no expressions as laws in neurology, and are
not derivable as laws from the laws of neurology. All of Taylor's
terms for describing the primacy of psychology--"key", "basic",
"appropriate"--suggest that in his view both neurology and psychology
explain the same things though psychology is said to be "more basic"
or whatever. The type-token distinction allows us to avoid the
claim that neurology and psychology explain the same things.
This, and the irreducibility of psychology obviate the need to
compare psychology and neurology in terms of their basicness,
keyness, or whatever; they don't have to be compared at all in
these vague respects, for there is a definite sense in which psychology
and neurology do not explain the same things. And thus the funda-
mental point that Taylor wishes to make--that the reduction of
psychology to physical science is not a priori guaranteed on the
neurological level (p. 67)--is made without obscure claims about
their relationship.
Footnotes
1. In other words, each event token which is an instance of
Mi is also an instance of some physical state; but it cannot
be concluded that every event token which is an instance of
Mi is an instance of the same physical state Pi.
2. I owe this example, and a good deal of this paragraph, to
Ned Block.
3. All that is needed is the highly plausible definition
(P) A physical event is one which instances some
physical property or several such properties.
4. The example is Putnam's. See Putnam, 1960.
5. I have eliminated the single quotes commonly placed around
predicates mentioned rather than used. The extra punctuation
only complicates the already difficult symbolism. The
context makes clear in each case whether use or mention
is at issue.
6. In this formula and those that follow I have eliminated
various terms which would surely be present in standard
formulations of any scientific laws, but are irrelevant to
my purposes. In particular I have eliminated all quantifiers
and variables, since their inclusion would only detract from
clarity of presentation. It must be remembered, however,
that when I speak of laws I mean something which relates
events and not properties. '(Mi ) --- (M2)' is shorthand
for a statement about events, not a logical relation of
properties. Properly it would read ' (x(Ml)x --- (M 2 )x).
In addition, I make not specification about the nature
of the ' --- ' connective.
7. When I say that Ml is coextensive with (PI v P 2 v P 3 • )
I mean
(x Ml)x iff. (P1)x v (P2)x v (P3)x * * )
8. The example is derived from Fodor.
9. See Goodman, 1955.
10. To the extent that identity theorists have confused (A), (B),
and (C), they will find the falsity of (B) and (C) either
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disastrous--if what they really wanted to prove all along
was (C)-- or reason to make a strategic retreat to the less
exciting thesis (A).
11. There are several terms which must be kept in balance
to generate an interesting problem: if physicalism is
defined too rigidly, emergence appears in trivial places,
e. g., with 'temperature'; if physicalism is defined too
loosely, so that any emergence is consistent with physicalism,
physicalism itself has been trivialized, probably watered
down to the simple ontological claim (A). An inverse relation
holds for definitions of 'emergence'. Some definitions of
emergence are unrealistically strict. Feigl, for example,
construes emergence as "the logical underivability'of pi from
P2 terms" where
'physical 1 terms' = df. 'all (empirical) terms
whose specification of meaning essentially
involves logical connections with the inter-
subjective observation language, as well as
the terms of this observation language itself'
(Feigl, 1956a, p. 424)
In other words, physical1 concepts are part of a language
game in which there are intersubjective criteria :of truth;
any science and parts of ordinary language contain physical1
concepts (terms).
'physical 2 concepts' = df. concepts 'sufficient
for the explanation . . of the observation
statements regarding the inorganic (lifeless)
domain of nature'
True emergence is the "logical underivability" of all
physicall concepts from physical 2 concepts (Feigl, 1956a,
p. 424).
Feigl has always admitted the possibility of this genuine
emergence, i. e., that certain biological or psychological
concepts "could not all be defined explicitly on the basis of
the primitives sufficient for the physics and chemistry of
inorganic phenomena" (Feigl, 1963, p. 265; cf. Feigl, 1956a,
p. 424).
If one takes "logical derivability" to mean synonymy,
then any psychological laws which cannot be translated into
behaviorese has emergent terms. But by such a strict
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criterion of derivability, it might well be the case that
thermodynamics is emergent relative to statistical mechanics.
After all, it does not seem to be the case that 'temperature'
means the same as 'mean kinetic energy of molecules'. If
it does not, and if we use Feigl's criterion of emergence,
the emergence of psychological properties would not indicate
that psychology was somehow importantly different from the
sciences of the inorganic generally, for similar emergence
would appear within the sciences of the inorganic themselves.
12. Perhaps the motivation was an allegiance to some (B) thesis,(though, again, it is hard to see what motivates this allegiance)
or to an event individuation theory like Brandt & Kim's (see
above, p. 10).
13. "Modern physicalism. . .unlike the materialism of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is behavioristic.
Consciousness on this view is either a special type of behavior,
'sampling' or 'running-back-and-forth' behavior as Tolman
has it, or a disposition to behave in a certain way, an itch for
example being a temporary propensity to scratch. In the case
of cognitive concepts like 'knowing,' 'believing,' 'understanding,'
'remembering,' and volitional concepts like 'wanting' and
'intending,' there can be little doubt, I think, that an analysis
in terms of dispositions to behave is fundamentally sound.
On the other hand, there would seem to be an intractable residue
of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness,
experience, sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort
of inner process story is unavoidable." (Place, 1956)
"A man is a vast arrangement of physical particles, but there
are not, over and above this, sensations or state of con-
sciousness. There are just behavioral facts about this vast
mechanism, such as that it expresses a temptation (behavior
disposition) to say /e. g. I 'There is a yellowish-red patch on
the wall' . .. ." (Smart, 1962, p. 35)
And more recently, J. Shaffer says that he agrees with Ryle
that in attributing most mental predicates to a person "we
are attributing to him some bit of behavior. . . or a disposition
toward behavior or both" (Shaffer, 1965, p. 81), but that "the
predicates which refer to feelings and sensations are not
analyzable into public, overt pieces of behavior, nor propen-
sities toward such acts" (p. 82).
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14. In fact, this article was one of the first to call attention to
the importance of a type-token distinction for the identity
theory. It is unfortunate that Taylor did not recognize how
significant this distinction is for the claims he makes about
the relation of psychology to the physical sciences.
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Stage - setting
In an earlier work ("Physicalism and Reduction") I developed
a relatively abstract definition of the physicalist program. In that
paper I argued that it is useful and historically plausible to consider
the physicalist program in the philosophy of mind as the attempt to
show that all nomic properties are physical properties. (Nomic
properties are those mentioned in the laws of any science. ) The
notion of physical property is dangerously obscure, but that problem
will not be relevant in this paper, for my concern will be with a
property, intentionality, which everyone considers at least prima
facie non-physical.
Three more familiar doctrines or programs commonly called
physicalist can be seen to derive from this broad definition. Inter-
theoretic reduction is in part an attempt to show that the properties
mentioned in, for example, psychological law are either coextensive
with or identical to physical properties. If the former holds, the
presumptively non-physical properties are dispensable from a
rigorous but complete statement of the laws of science; if the latter,
the psychological properties are physical properties. The mind-body
identity theory (now often said to be the thesis of physicalism, despite
the historical priority of others), as traditionally formulated, is just
this property identity claim. The bridge-laws of the reduction of
psychology to neurology were, it wa.s said, going to support law-like
generalizations of the form revent x has property Pi iff. event x has
property Mi-; and it was the claim of the identity theory that in fact
every mental property was identical to some property of physical theory
because, for example, predicate 'Mi' and predicate 'Pi' denote or ex-
press one and the same property. The new, more precise formulations of
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identity theory differentiate between this claim and the claim that
all events (dated individual events, that is) are physical, with no
claim being made about properties. These weaker event-token
theses do not even warrant the elimination of putatively mental
properties from science, but do, if true, show that monistic ontology
of events is in no way threatened by the putatively mental properties L
they may instantiate. Logical behaviorism, a third sort of physi-
calism, can be understood as an attempt to show, without inter-
theoretic reduction, that the putatively mental properties of psychology
are physical properties because the predicates ascribing the psycho-
logical properties are synonymous with predicates ascribing certain
physical properties (motions and dispositions). The mind-body
identity theory arose historically not from success in reduction but
from the failure of behaviorism to physicalize in a linguistic manner
phenomenal predicates like 'is in pain', thereby apparently leaving
out of account certain decidedly mental properties. The identity
theory was seen as a reasonable addition to the basically successful
behaviorist analysis of the mental.
Various confusions and errors are to be found in these disparate
doctrines and the relationships various philosophers seem to have
believed they stood. The point that concerns us here, though, is
that the presumption that logical behaviorism gives a correct account -
of all mental states and properties except the experiential or
phenomenal ones is surely false. We are now in the luxurious position
1
of having a rich variety of refutations . If logical behaviorism is false
(and let us assume that it is) the physicalist program is back at square
one, for now not only are the phenomenal properties problematic, but
so also are all the properties that logical behaviorism was thought to
have shown to be physical properties. Psychological states such
as thinking, wanting, fearing, believing, et al. are now again
problematic for physicalism. These states are the very heart of
psychology, and some account of them is necessary if physicalism
is to have any substance whatsoever. Identity theory is of little
help, for empirical evidence and philosophical argument2 clearly
favor an event-token identity theory over the much stronger property
identity theory.
Intentionality
The psychological states of which behaviorism was thought to
give a correct account--thinking, willing, etc. -- all display a re-
markable property, intentionality. Most concern has focused on
this property, rather than on specific accounts of thinking, belief,
or whatever. Intentionality was introduced into recent philosophical
discussion by Brentano. He claimed that mental states are
characterized
by what the scholastics of the middle ages referred
to as the intentional (also the mental) inexistence of
the objects, and what we, although with not quite un-
ambiguous expression, would call relation to a content,
direction upon an object (which is not here to be under-
stood as a reality), or immanent objectivity.
(Psych . from Empir. Standpoint,
quoted from Chisholm, 1957, p. 168)
In a very rough and intuitive way, I suppose everyone has a sense of
what 'the directedness of the mind to an object' means: one can think
about unicorns, round squares, possible states of affairs--things that
do not exist. And it is easy to believe that one is thinking in each of
these cases about some particular thing. One is tempted to say that
one is thinking about some peculiar sort of object. For it might well
be argued that we have identity notions for such objects and our acts
of thinking about them, just as we do for objects which do exist.
For example, Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern are different objects,
and thinking about Rosenkrantz and thinking about Guildenstern are
two different mental acts; just as Quine and Chomsky are different
things, and thinking about Quine a different mental act from thinking
about Chomsky. (Needless to say, the existence of adequate identity
criteria for propositional objects of thought--be they propositions or
something else--is another matter entirely. )
Whether these intuitions can be built into a coherent and
plausible theory of mental life is still very much an open question.
But even if this vaguely realist talk of the objects of thought is
eschewed, intentionality still poses a serioud problem for the
physicalist program in the philosophy of mind. There is another,
far more perspicuous formulation of Brentano's thesis which suggests
just how difficult a problem it is. Recent discussion of intentionality
is immensely indebted to Chisholm for giving a clear linguistic for-
mulation of intentionality, allowing us to avoid for many purposes
the traditional and obscure vocabulary of mental relatedness.
Chisholm proposes that a verbal predicate is intentional only if the
sentence in which it is used is intentional. A sentence is intentional
only if
(i) "it uses a substantival expression--a name or a description--
in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies
that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival
expression truly applies" (Chisholm, 1957, p. 170)
or (ii) if it contains a propositional clause, "neither the sentence
nor its contradictory implies either that the propositional clause is
true or that it is false" (p. 171)
or (iii) substitution of identicals does not preserve truth value
(p. 171). Let us add one further definition: an entity is in an
intentional state I at time t. iff. there is an intentional predicate
m 1
'm' true of the entity at time t..1
Using this notion of intentionality, Chisholm reformulates
Brentano's thesis in the following way:
Let us say (1) that we do not need to use intentional
sentences when we describe nonpsychological phenomena;
we can express all our beliefs about what is merely
'physical' in sentences which are not intentional. But
(2) when we wish to describe perceiving, assuming,
believing, knowing, wanting, hoping, and other such
attitudes, then either (a) we must use sentences which
are intentional or (b) we must use terms we do not need
to use when we describe nonpsychological phenomena.
(pp. 172-173)
The immense utility of logical behaviorism should now be
fairly clear. If logical behaviorism is true, the second part of
Chisholm's version of Brentano's thesis is false. If an intentional
predicate e. g., 'believes that p' is synonymous with 'does behavior
B or is disposed to do B ', the intentional predicate is synonymous
p p
with a non-intentional one, thereby eliminating the intentional pre-
dicate from the list of what were said to be distinctively mental
predicates. Since synonymous predicates denote or express the
same property, and since the behavioristic properties are (it was
assumed) physical properties, intentional predicates, it turns out,
denote physical properties.
If logical behaviorism were true, believing (say) that the present
king of France is bald need not be defined by the rather mysterious
notion of relatedness to a content, nor even by the linguistic property
".L
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of intentionality. Believing that the present king of France is bald
is nothing more (it was said) than a set of dispositions to say or do
certain things and the actual doing of them. Thinking that the present
king of France is bald is nothing more than saying, or being disposed
to say, that he is, and acting accordingly. If all the apparently in-
tentional states can be handled in this manner, the supposed relatedness
to a mental or semantic content is shown to be not hing more than
physical dispositions to behave and certain behaviors. Intentionality
is then no more mental than any disposition or behavior.
It is now, of course, difficult to see how anyone could have
believed any of this; or at least why it was believed with such fervor.
With the decline of logical behaviorism and the growing suspicion that
identity theory was not an adequate account of all the problems with
intentionality for the physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind,
intentionality should have received greater attention. But no direct
consideration of the problem occurred till Dennett's pioneering Content
and Consciousness (1969), perhaps because so many were mesmerized
by the identity theory and perhaps also because interest in the tradi-
tional scope of physicalism had substantially diminished. To understand
Dennett's approach--what he sees the problem to be, and what sorts of
answers he thinks appropriate--we must briefly consider another
recent contribution to the study of intentionality.
Quine' s Strategy
As I noted above, the return of intentionality as a problematic
property for the physicalist program has caused surprisingly little
distress. This is particularly odd in view of the fact that Chisholm's
work now gives us such a tangible grasp of the problem. There are
those who have tried (or can be understood as having tried) to give
some kind of physicalist account of intentionality. The three I have
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in mind are Quine, Davidson, and Dennett. Dennett is the most
direct, being explicitly concerned with intentionality. But properly
understood Davidson and Quine appear to have devised a most
ingenious approach to intentionality which antedates and to some
extent has influenced Dennett's work.
Quine's approach to intentionality is idiosyncratic, occurring
in connection with his doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation,
and not through a concern with traditional inter-theoretic reduction
or identity theory. Thus I think we can begin to understand his
strategy by Davidson's use of it (even though Davidson's work is
contemporary with Dennett's and appears not to have influenced it
to anywhere near the degree Quine's has, if at all), for Davidson
is concerned with both of these more familiar ideas. In two important
and influential papers "Mental Events" (1970) and "The Material Mind"
(1971) Davidson argues in effect that the identity theory has failed to
disambiguate an event token identi-y claim from a state type identity
claim. According to the former, all event tokens are physical events.
But this is consistent with any event, e i., having a property P in
virtue of which it falls under physical law and having a distinct property
M in virtue of which it falls under a psychological law. M can be
identical to P only if (e)(P iff. M ), and there is nothing in even token
e e
identity theory which requires or demonstrates this claim. In fact,
Davidson specifically argues that the instances of a mental state type
will comprise a heterogeneous group of neurological or physical states
susceptible only of brute enumeration. Even if such an enumeration
were successfully completed, we would have no way of knowing we had
done so, nor any reason to assume that the resultant statement
'M iff. P or P' or P' or P'"e . .' was law-like. Without such
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a law-like statement, the laws of psychology could not be derived
from those of neurology or any other science.
Thus far, Davidson's position is very much like the one Fodor
developed somewhat later, and which was discussed in "Physicalism
and Reduction" and briefly at the beginning of this paper. Now this
position is tolerant of--in fact welcomes--irreducible psychological
laws. This is contrary to both the spirit and letter (at least in some
forms) of physicalism. But Davidson's intent seems to be something
quite different. And Quine's intent certainly is. Davidson seems to
argue, using Quinean doctrine, that something is not quite right with
the intentional states and laws which occur in psychology. Quine
uses the same argument to show that something is definitely wrong
with them, but it is simply unclear how far Davidson is willing to
go with Quine.
Davidson asserts, quite reasonably, that psychology must in-
clude an understanding of language and meaning. But, he says, to
understand a single speech-act
we must have a grasp of the speaker's unrealized
dispositions to perform other speech-acts. Indeed
we may think of having, or knowing, a language as
a simple, highly structured, and very complex,
disposition of the speaker
(Davidson, 1971, pp. 718-719)
Thus in understanding the language use of persons
We start with wholes /_the complex disposition/, and
infer (or construct) an underlying structure. Meaning
is the operative aspect of this structure. Since the
structure is inferred . . . we must view meaning itself
as a theoretical construction. Like any construct it is
arbitrary except for the formal and empirical constraints
we impose on it. In the case of meaning the constraints
cannot fix the theory of interpretation. The reason, as
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Quine has convincingly argued, is that sentences a
speaker holds to be true are determined, in ways
we can only partly disentangle, by what the speaker
means by how words and what he believes about the
world. A better way to put this would be to say:
belief and meaning cannot be uniquely constructed
from speech behavior.
(Davidson, 1971, p. 720)
Davidson does not present his position so forcefully as he
should. Radical claims are made with little argument. (Davidson
is surely in the minority if he thinks that Quine has "convincingly
argued" the view they propound. ) The thrust of the position is
better put if we say it is onq "in the case of meaning Lthat/ the
constraints cannot fix the theory of interpretation. " The view is
that intentional theories--theories which ascribe intentional states
to entities--are in a special sort of trouble. All theories are under-
determined by evidence, but intentional theory is said to be indeter-
minate in some greater or additional sense. It is not entirely clear
just what this other sense is, thought at a minimum it entails that
if all physical theory were determinate, intentional theory still
would not be. One consequence of this theory is that there can be
no type-type identities from psychology to neurology because the
psychological side--the intentional states of meaning--will always
possess an indefinite number of interpretations, indistinguishable
from the standpoint of neurology and physicalistic behaviorism, but
'intentionally distinct'. For example, one might mean by 'There is
a shooting star' that a star has entered the earth's atmosphere, for
one believes that some stars are tiny rocks; or one might mean that
something or other is shooting through the atmosphere for one
believes that it could not be a star which is so behaving for they
are hot and very distant (Davidson, 1971, p. 720). This moderate
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conclusion is about as far as Davidson goes. Quine, on the other
hand, wants to go much further.
Davidson says very little about the status of intentional
psychology. Given the distinctive indeterminacy of intentional
theory in which Davidson believes, one would expect intentional
psychology to have a problematic status. It is defective relative
to physical theory; its mentalistic predicates cannot be physicalized
either by synonymy relations or inter-theoretic reduction. Yet
intentional theory--or at least intentional idiom--is firmly entrenched
in ordinary and scientific praxis. Davidson says very little about
these matters. But where Davidson is indistinct, Quine speaks with
a loud voice. Intentional theory, he says, is not really science at
all, but "projection" acceptable only as part of a "second-rate"
formalization of our conceptual framework, a formalization which
will include the vagaries of ordinary language (Quine, 1960, p. 221).
Unlike all previous physicalists, however, Ouine does not try to
eliminate or physicalize intentionality. Instead he finds a brilliant
way to both accept intentionality and (some version of) Brentano's
thesis and at the same time reject them from science. He explicitly
states that "Brentano's thesis is of a part with the indeterminacy of
translation" (Quine, 1960). Quine's argument is roughly this:
Genuine science is extensional, for only in extensional language do
we have adequate identity criteria. Since there is "no entity without
identity, meanings are not scientifically acceptable entities, or not
entities at all. Because we lack extensional criteria for the identity
of meanings, we lack extensional reductions of intentional idioms.
But this is precisely the first part of Brentano's thesis. Quine
admits that this is true, apparently giving intentional psychology
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a special place. But, Quine continues, precisely because of those
features in virtue of which intentional phenomena are specially
emergent (their indeterminacy relative to extensional fact),
intentional phenomena lack the characteristics necessary for regi-
mentation into the body of science. The very features of language
and meaning which give intentionality a special place are the very
phenomena which prevent intentional psychology from being a genuine
science.
The goal of this strategy, if not its argument, should now be
obvious. The irreducibility of intentionality is fully admitted, but
the conception of intentionality and science that is used permits
Quine to defuse the impact of Brentano's thesis. Recall that that
thesis, as formulated by Chisholm, explicitly stated
(2) When we wish to describe perceiving, assuming
believing, knowing, wanting, hoping, and other such
attitudes, then either (a) we must use sentences which
are intentional or (b) we must use terms we do not need
to use when we describe nonpsychological phenomena.
(Supra, p. 6)
Quine will admit that this is true, but defuses it by denying its
apparent corollaries, that the science of mind is in good part the
study of intentional states and that psychological law must be
formulated in intentional terms. Intentionality is accepted, but
its relevance to scientific psychology is denied--thereby saving a
general sort of physicalism without denying or explaining away the
obvious presence of intentional phenomena. As Quine puts it:
One may accept the Brentano thesis as showing either
the indispensability of intentional idioms and the impor-
tance of an autonomous science of intention, or as
showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the
emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike
Brentano's, is the second.
(Quine, 1960, p. 221)
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But there is a serious and immediate problem with this
strategy: Quine has no scientific psychology at the present time.
Any intentional psychology (as is much of cognitive and develop-
mental psychology) is rejected as not genuinely scientific; and all
the extant attempts at a non-intentional psychology, e. g.,
behaviorism, have been dismal failures. Yet Quine continues to
insist, and must insist, that some non-intentional psychology is
possible, else he will have no scientific psychology at all. This,
surely is the source of Quine's faith in behaviorism (and perhaps
neurology also).
It is not, fortunately, my task to evaluate Quine's stunning
attempt to save physicalism. What is important here is to get a
general grasp of Quine's position, for it illuminates Dennett's
strategy and some aspects of his otherwise obscure position.
PART B:
Dennett' s Theories
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Introduction
The first part of this section deals with Dennett's two somewhat
distinct models of the relationship of intentional idioms (and science)
to extensional idioms (and science), and with objections, conflicts,
and problems inherent in the models themselves. The second part
deals directly with Dennett's objection to the admission of inten-
tionality to science.
Dennett's First Model
Dennett is willing to meet the problem of intentionality head-on.
He admits
1. Intentionality is an apparently non-physical property
2. Intentionality is now necessary for formulation of the
laws of psychology.
But he believes that
3. A purely intentional science "would entail a catastrophic
rearrangement of science in general. "
(Dennett, 1969, p. 39)
(1) and (2) imply that psychology is not, as currently formulated, a
physical science, and that surely is an honest place for a physicalist
to begin. (Dennett's reasons for believing (3) are not immediately
apparent; in fact, he never argues for the truth of (3), but seems to
assume it. We shall get some hints of his concern when we examine
his objections to intentionality in the second part, pp. 72ff'. )
Since he sees the problem of intentionality as the relatively
straightforward (3), Dennett begins with attempts at a straightforward
answer. In Content and Consciousness he attempts to find a new way
to eliminate intentional idioms from science. He appeals neither to
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behaviorism nor (explicitly) to inter-theoretic reduction, but his
goal is clear: to frame "within the scientific language the criteria--
the necessary and sufficient conditic s--for the truth of mental
language sentences" and then to explain the apparently mental
phenomena in this scientific language (Dennett, 1969, p. 19). Let
us call this proposal the Dennett reduction (or D-rea,_ction for
short) of intentionality. Dennett does not specify what scientific
language consists in, but he is quite clear that it is extensional, for
he reads Brentano's thesis as saying that the scientific criteria of
mentalistic idioms cannot be found because "no statement or state-
ments about Intentional phenomena can have the same truth conditions
as any statement about non-Intentional phenomena" (Dennett, 1969,
p. 20). Obviously either D-reduction cannot be accomplished or
Brentano's thesis (in any form) is false. Content and Consciousness
and the subsequent articles can be read as attempts to refine both
D-reduction and Brentano's thesis and to show that some form of
D-reduction is possible.
Dennett hopes that psychologists will create "a truly predictive,
extensional science of animal and human behavior (specified in pure
motion terms and including all human behavior). . . ." (Dennett,
1969, pp. 32-33). Presumably after such a science has been created,
philosophers can attempt to determine whether Brentano's thesis is
true or not, and more generally to ascertain what relationship does
hold between intentional and extensional idioms and between inten-
tional psychology and physical science. Dennett thinks this the best
way to demonstrate Quine's claim--which he wholeheartedly accepts--
of "the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a
science of intention" (Quoted by Dennett from Quine, 1960, p. 221).
But Dennett's program is in fa.ct more traditional than Quine's.
He does not accept Brentano's thesis as true (as does Quine), nor
does he advert to Quine's use of the thesis of the indeterminacy of
translation to argue for the eliminability of intentional idioms from
genuine science. Instead he sets out to show how Brentano's thesis
might turn out to be false! Dennett is fully aware that there is a
wealth of evidence for the truth of Brentano's thesis. But, as he
points out, that evidence is roughly identical with the evidence for
the falsity of logical behaviorism. There is, he thinks, one other
way in which reductive definitions of intentional statements might
be found. Dennett hopes that there will be appropriate relations
between intentional idioms and, instead of "overt behavioral clues,
covert, internal events serving as conditions of ascription" (Dennett,
1969, p. 39). That is, he wants to find statements which relate an
intentional idiom and some neurological idiom in such a way that we
can eliminate the intentional idiom from science.
Dennett is unfortunately most obscure about the nature of
D-reduction. His claim seems to be that for every intentional
property M (such as the property denoted by ' . . . believes that
p'), M is true of entity A iff. extensional property P is true of A.
But if the properties are coextensive, one wonders how this might
be shown. The claim cannot be that the mental predicate ascribing
M and the neurological predicate ascribing P mean the same. The
only way I see to establish the coextensivity of the two properties is
through finding appropriate relations between intentional states or
properties and neurological ones, as the inter-theoretic reduction
does by finding bridge-laws. But Dennett says nothing about the
traditional intertheoretic reduction, and in fact tries to employ a
much weaker notion. He states:
The controls and activities of computers can certainly
be given an extensional description, and if they can also
be characterixed justifiably in intentional terms, we
shall have one case of an intentional-extensional reduction,
and hence good reason for expecting a similar reduction in
the case of animals and people.
(Dennett, 1969, pp. 44-45)
Now this sense of reduction is so weak that it does not require inter-
theoretic reduction of intentional laws. All it says, in effect, is that
if an event has an intentional explanation (an explanation via a law
which relates intentional states) it also has an extensional explanation
-- and that that is sufficient for reducing intentionality and intentional
laws. But if event token identity theory is true and physics is com-
plete, it is trivially true that an event which has an intentional ex-
planation also has an extensional one. And, for reasons already
mentioned, this D-reduction will not eliminate intentional laws.
Yet Dennett specifically wants to conclude that this sense of reduction
is strong enough to block inference from the irreducibility of inten-
tionality to the thesis of
an unbridgeable gap between the mental and the
physical--whether this is construed as a radical
dualism of phenomena, or of sciences, or of modes
of cdescription and explanation.
(Dennett, 1969, p. 89, my emphasis)
But a "dualism" of the sciences is what we get if there is failure
of traditional inter-theoretic reduction for psychology and neurology.
And there is considerable reason to believe that such a failure is
likely. Dennett' s notion of reduction is too weak to prevent what he
says it will prevent. The reason, I suspect, that Dennett opts for
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such a weak sense of reduction is that, on the one hand, he thinks
intentionality must be eliminated, but, on the other hand, does not
want to claim outright that Brentano's thesis is false. The reason
he does not explicitly attack Brentano' s thesis (an attack we might
well have expected, given his general program) is the hope that his
vague sense of reduction can be made to work, allowing him to give
provisional acceptance and independence to intentional psychology
while maintaining its ultimate dispensibility. In this he wants to
be like Quine, but his program is tied too closely to the older
physicalism which wanted to eliminate intentionality directly and
cleanly (as in behaviorism). Quine holds no hope for a reduction
of intentionality, but Dennett still does, at least in places, and that
is what creates so much confusion in his work. ( In his later works,
Dennett has tended to downplay the reduction theme, trying in several
ways to do what Quine and Davidson do with the argument from the
indeterminacy of translation, namely to show that intentional
psychology is inherently second-rate and dispensible.)
Dennett backs away from the obscurities of D-reduction almost
immediately to make another proposal. D-reduction first looked
like an ordinary biconditional reduction; then it seemed to shift to
a notion too weak to be of use. Dennett makes a third, and equally
puzzling, proposal. He suggests that instead of biconditional relations
between intentional psychological idioms and extensional neurological
idioms, we will find such relations with intentional neurological
idioms! "Could there be a system of internal states or events, the
extensional description of which could be upgraded into an Intentional
description? . . . Yes." (Dennett, 1969, p. 40) This upgrading re-
quires showing that there can be "conceptually trustworthy formulations
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roughly of the form 'physical state S has the significance (or
means, or has the content) that p' . . ." (Ibid. ) Presumably
a D-reduction sentence would look something like this
(x) Intentional state M)x iff. (Physical state S)x)
I being (say) 'believes that p' and where S "means p. " Now
Dennett' s program began with a proposal for the elimination of
intentionality through biconditional reduction sentences with in-
tentional idioms on one side, extensional ones on the other. But
now he shifts his claim. He maintains that both sides of the state-
ment will be intentional. The brain state is said to be about some-
thing. But if this is the case, it is very difficult to see how the
intentional idioms have been eliminated. Instead of saying the
person believes, desires, etc. we are permitted to say that his brain
is in a state of belief, desire, etc. How this eliminates intentional
idioms is a mystery to me. To say that extensional descriptions
could be "upgraded" into intentional ones is not only vague but utterly
inappropriate to the original task. Either a sentence is intentional
or it is not. It is not possible to make an extensional. If the physical
side of a reduction is not extensional, a proper D-reduction has not
been accomplished.
Perhaps Dennett's point is only that there is no reason not to
ascribe intentional properties to brain events, and that therefore
intentionality raises no problems for the identity theory via a
Leibnitz' Law objection; and indeed Dennett spends a good deal of
time attempting to show that the ascription of meaning to brain states
is possible, spending very little time indeed on the problem of the
reduction to extensional idioms. It is certainly refreshing to hear
it openly discussed that neurology might now (now) couch its theories
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in a physicalist language. But we are still left with the reduction
problem, that of describing the relationship between extensional
idioms and science and intentional idioms and science. Ascribing
propositional content to the nervous system does not improve our
chances of finding biconditional relations between intentional and
extensional statements. Dennett appears to believe that either we
will develop a non-intentional science of mind or that some kind of
reduction statements will be discovered. (Perhaps he sees the two
suggestions as going together, it is hard to tell. ) But he does not
offer such reduction statements, nor does he successfully describe
the reduction relation he has in mind. This, as I see it, is a lacuna
at the very point where we want the most thorough explication.
Dennett's Second Model
Dennett's later work avoids the mysterious upgrading of
neurology. What he proposes is, instead, a hierarchy of languages
or theories of the behavior of organisms (or any entity with suffi-
ciently complex behavior). The prediction and explanation of more
complex systems, he argues, is most felicitously accomplished
with intentional idioms: the computer perceives that both its rook
and its pawn are threatened; it perceives that the pawn is in a most
strategic spot; it wants to win; therefore, it will protect the pawn.
Dennett calls this sort of use of intentional language, regardless of
the nature of the entity and its manner of processing information,
the "Intentional Stance" (Dennett, 1971). One uses it, he says,
because it is the easiest mode of explanation. No ontological
questions (is the computer therefore animate?) nor epistemological
questions (Does it have experience ?) are to receive their answers
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simply from the fact that we adopt the Intentional stance.
Theories which give us characterizations of the rules of
computation that go on in a system when it behaves are called
"design" theories. Dennett is not too clear about what design
stance descriptions and explanations look like. Presumably
they are non-intentional, though Dennett specifically states they
may be "purpose-relative" (Dennett, 1971, p. 88). Perhaps a
design stance explanation would look something like this: 'The
computer moved the pawn because it computed the success pro-
babilities of the possible moves according to rule R, and that
move was maximal'.
Dennett is curiously ambiguous about the ontological status
of design states. He often seems to contrast their genuineness
with the "heuristic" character of intentional states; for example,
he says what we want to do in psychology is account for an animal' s
behavior "in terms of its design" (Dennett, 1971, p. 96). Yet this
would seem to be inconsistent with the fictionalist view of all non-
physical theory Dennett encapsulates in his characterization of the
"physical stance". The physical stance is said to tell us about "the
actual, physical state of the particular object" via our "knowledge
of the laws of nature" (Dennett, 1971, p. 88). All other states must
then, be fictional in some strong sense (though Dennett never spells
it out); they might be inventions designed to facilitate theory and not
truly states of the things to which we loosely ascribe them. 3 I do
not find this position very clear, for I am not sure as to what is
acceptable to Dennett as a law of nature, nor why only physical
states are "actual" (nor just what this claim amounts to). If the
"actual, physical state" is the state described by the basic science,
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physics, design stance theories--along with all the theories of
the special sciences--are fictional. Since it certainly seems
that we have laws of nature in other sciences--chemistry, for
example--it is reasonable to assume that the states mentioned
by such laws are "actual". But then it becomes most unclear
why it is that only intentional states are fictional. Some sort of
Quinean move would be logical here, but Dennett never makes it.
(We shall have more to say about Dennett's fictionalism and his
obscure hostility to intentionality in the next section of this paper. )4
This model of the sciences puts in even higher relief the
difficulties with the original model. Dennett claims that
if one wants to predict and explain the 'actual
empirical' behavior of believers, one must . . .
cease talking of belief and descend to the design
stance or the physical stance for one's account.
(Dennett, 1971, p. 106)
This claim is certainly contrary to most of the available evidence,
the evidence which has led psychology away from behaviorism and
which suggests that at least for the present time successful pre-
diction and explanation of animate behavior does require intentional
description. Dennett is surely aware of this, and is presumably
speaking of what will be the case, given the development of physi-
calist science. But then the deeper confusions on Dennett's part
appear. He seems completely unaware of the recent work by Putnam,
Fodor, and Davidson, which suggests that there is every reason to
believe that psychology is not reducible to neurology because there
will be event types in the laws of psychology which are not nomically
coextensive with the event types in the laws of any other science.
We must admit, surely, that what is described and explained in the
69
laws of any science is "actual". And we can do this without
compromising a monistic ontology of physical events. 5
What I think Dennett is in effect trying to do in introducing
the hierarchy of stances is to propose a new model of reduction,
one which is not so strong as to use bridge-laws, yet strong enough
for us to speak of a genuine hierarchy of related sciences rather
than the looser relation envisaged, for example, by Fodor. The
levels must have some independence, but there must be some kind
of reduction of intentionality, or intentional theory. Dennett wants
to find a place between traditional inter-theoretic reduction and
Fodor's theory of irreducibility. That is a worthy physicalist goal,
for inter-theoretic reduction now seems too strong to be true, and
Fodor's model decimates the traditional thesis of the unity of the
sciences. Indeed, one can see why anyone concerned with the
nature of science might be concerned to find some middle ground.
But Dennett has not done so. For, as we saw above (p 66 ), he is
unable to articulate a sense of reduction appropriate to this strategy.
His sense of reduction is too weak to reduce laws and the apparently
"actual" states mentioned in them. It in no way guarantees anything
stronger than the claim that every event which has an intentional
explanation also has a purely physicalistic one. No interesting
inter-theoretic relations are even suggested.
There are yet other problems with Dennett's second model.
As we saw, he wants to say that only the physical description tells
us what is "actual", and that the intentional description is a
"heuristic overlay" (Dennett, 1969, p. 80). But in "Intentional
Systems", the design stance itself is characterized in such a way
that Dennett endangers his own 'actuality' claim. As he defines it
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(pp. 87-88), the design stance includes the program and hence
(he says) design stance explanations rely on the "notion of function,
which is purpose-relative or teleological" (p. 88). But then there
is a very real question as to whether there is a non-intentional
functional state explanation of human behavior. If the design stance
is rich enough to intentional states, what is to prevent the possi-
bility that the only true design stance descriptions of human beings
include intentional states among the functionals? If the program is
a description of the internal processing states of an entity and how
these are related to one another, there is nothing to prevent the
functional states from being intentional. Dennett seems to have
assumed that the functional states of humans are non-intentional.
We have no a priori reason to think that this is true.
Even if the functional states of humans are non-intentional,
the design stance theory of functional states may still not reduce
to a physical stance theory in the required way. If D-reductions
of intentionality are to be obtained there must be some kind of
fairly tight relations between the laws of the various sciences.
(The fundamental problem, again, is that Dennett does not tell us
what these relations are. ) The work of Putnam and Fodor (See
footnote 2) demonstrates quite effectively that functional states
are in all probability not coextensive with physical states and that
functional state theories are not reducible to physical theories
according to the traditional model. Assuming humans could be
described as organisms with functional states, we have not assumed
intentionality, but we have assumed functional states which charac-
terize the behavior of infinitely many different physical devices.
What is to prevent a really hard-nosed physicalist from claiming
that functional states are merely a heuristic device which presupposes
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teleology and thus takes out a promissory note on the notion of
purpose, and which, therefore, should be replaced by physical
stance description and explanation? If Dennett can accept
functional states which introduce purpose and falsify the tradi-
tional model of reduction, why is he so hard on Brentano's thesis,
which could be interpreted as saying simply that the functional
state descriptions of human beings require intentional idioms?
Dennett has a strong allegiance to physicalism in some form,
yet he is apparently willing to accept functional states which would
falsify the traditional model of reduction. His claim that "we want
to explain the intelligence of man (or beast) in terms of his design"
(Dennett, 1971, p. 96), rather than use intelligence and other im-
plicitly intentional terms is vacuous if the functional states (the
program) of human beings is intentional. If the functional states
are not intentional states, it is still by no means clear that the
functional states are "purely mechanical regularities" given that
they are probably "teleological" (Dennett, 1971, p. 88) and that
functional states seem to be states whose laws are not obviously
reducible to physical stance laws. Dennett's problem is that he
wants to eliminate intentional characterizations on the grounds that
they are just further interpretation of the extensional descriptions.
But there seems to be no motivated reason in his theory for drawing
the 'actuality' line against intentionality alone rather than against
all non-physical (in the sense of physics) state types. But this
brings us to what will be our second topic of consideration, Dennett's
hostility to intentionality.
PART C:
Dennett' s Objections
to
Intentional Psychology
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Dennett has several arguments (or suggestions for arguments)
to the effect that an intentional psychology is somehow illegitimate.
It is my concern in this section to try to determine just what those
arguments are, and to determine if they establish what Dennett
thinks they do.
Intentional States Are Not "Empirical"
Dennett's first objection to intentional psychology is that
intentional states are not "real" or "empirical" or "actual" features
of any entity (Dennett, 1971). He presumably holds some belief like
Quine' s that intentional descriptions are "projections" (Quine, 1960,
p. 220) and in some way not really true of the things to which we
ascribe them. Unfortunately Dennett (nor Quine for that matter)
does not spell out in any detail what the curious ontological status
of intentional states is. As we saw above, Dennett is convinced
that only physical states are 'real'. Perhaps what he wishes to
claim is not that only physical states--the states ascribed in physics--
are really real, but that the states ascribed by all the inorganic
sciences, physiology, and neurology are 'real', but that psychological
states, or any states with propositional content, are not. This
more tolerant conception reflects the traditional physicalist belief
that it is intentional states, or psychological states generally,
which are problematic. But even on this more liberal reading, it
is difficult to see what motivates drawing such a rigid line among
the states ascribed by the various sciences.
Dennett's first argument is a non-starter, for it seems to be
a presumption and not an argument. He repeatedly asserts that no
conclusions about an entity are to be drawn from the fact that we
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"adopt" the "Intentional Stance" in describing and explaining the
behavior of that organism (Dennett, 1971). But this will not work.
We do not just adopt the intentional stance, any more than we
"adopt" the belief that there are physical objects; both beliefs are
fully entrenched in ordinary and scientific praxis. Pretending that
we could just drop the intentional stance does not mean we could.
Some psychologists have tried to show that we could explain animate
behavior in a non-intentional way, but it is now generally conceded
that these attempts were failures. But at least they tried to show
that we could dispense with the intentional stance because a viable
alternative was (so they said) at hand. Dennett, on the other hand,
wants to argue the point with no alternative in sight. And indeed,
we shall see shortly that Dennett's arguments are (roughly) a priori.
But even if we accept Dennett's claim about the "adoption" of
stances, we could by no means conclude from this alone that in-
tentional accounts are fictional. For if intentional psychological
theory is apparently true of certain things, the simplest assumption
is that the theory works because it contains laws of states which
the entity really has! (In fact, one wonders what better evidence
there could be for an entity's having a property than that the pro-
perty is ascribed by scientific law. ) Unless Dennett wants to adopt
an instrumentalist view of scientific theory generally, thereby
casting doubt on the reality of physical as well as psychological
states, it is difficult to see why he maintains that psychological
states are not 'real'.
Dennett has another argument for the fictional status of
psychological theory. The argument is latent in several articles,
but is nowhere explicitly presented because it intertwines with his
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claim that intentional psychology is question begging (see below,
p. 81 ). The argument is really quite simple: a non-question-
begging psychology is a psychology which does not ascribe inten-
tional states; therefore, a psychology which does ascribe intentional
states is fictional, for the states it ascribes are not the states
ascribed by a non-question-begging psychology (See Dennett, 1974,
pp. 17-18). But everything here depends on the question-begging,
on how badly what question has been begged. Dennett complains
that intentional psychology does not answer the crucial question
"What makes for intelligence?" But at least on some interpretations,
this failure does not entail anything about the fictional status of
intentional psychology. Newton's theory of gravitational attraction
does not answer the question "What makes for gravitional attraction?"
in a clearly non-question-begging way. It does say that mass makes
for gravitational attraction, but it does not say why it is or how it is
that mass produces gravitational attraction. Indeed, this was one of
the primary objections to its original acceptance, viz., its reliance
on 'occult' qualities; perhaps a more modern philosopher would say
that the theory begged the question (or some question). But I don't
think that Dennett wants to claim that Newton' s theory of gravita-
tional attraction is fictional. Even if he does, he is not out of the
woods; for if he does claim that acceptable physical theory may be
fictional, it will (again) be hard to see what makes the (ex, hypot. )
fictional status of some psychological theory problematic and a
mark of differentiation from the physical sciences.
Dennett's most complete argument for the fictional status of
psychology centers on the obscure claim that intentional explanations
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are "normative" and not "empirical".
Deciding on the basis of available empirical evidence
that something is a piece of copper or a lichen permits
one to make predictions based on the empirical theories
dealing with copper and lichens, but deciding on the
basis of available evidence that something is (to be
treated as) an Intentional system permits predictions
having a normative or logical basis rather than an
empirical one, ....
(Dennett, 1971, p. 97)
Now what does Dennett mean by 'normative' ? He states
The assumption that something is an Intentional system
is the assumption that it is rational; that is, one gets
nowhere with the assumption that entity x has beliefs
p, q, r . . . unless one also supposes that x believes
what follows from p, q, r, . . ; otherwise there is no
way of ruling out the prediction that x will, in the face
of its beliefs p, q, r, . . . do something utterly stupid,
and, if we cannot rule out that prediction, we will have
acquired no predictive power at all.
(Dennett, 1971, p. 95)
What I think he means, then, is this. If we ascribe beliefs p, q,
and r to an intentional system, and s follows from the conjunction
of p, q, and r, then we can say the intentional system ought to
believe s. And we will have some reason to believe that the system
does believe s: our previous ascription of p, q, and r and our
assumption that the system is rational generate the prediction that
the system believes s. The prediction is based on the logical point
that s does follow from the conjunction of p, q, and r; and on the
normative point that one who believes p, q, and r ought, other things
being equal, to believe s. If it turns out that the system apparently
does not believe s (he denies it, and acts consistently with this
denial) we have two options: The first is to say that belief in s is
part of the evidence for our believing that he believes p, q, and r;
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and so perhaps stern denial of belief in s is reason to think he
does not really believe p, q, and r. On this option, we juggle
with the ascribed beliefs to make the system more consistent.
The other option is to say that the system is, after all, "human"--
it makes mistakes, there are gaps in its knowledge, it gets tired
and has trouble following deductions, it never had the opportunity
to wonder whether anything followed from the conjunction of p, q
and r, it has inc onsistent beliefs. There comes a point where
both options begin to fail us. We might come across what we thought
was an intentional system, but whose behavior was so primitive or
disorganized that it no longer made sense to ascribe intentional
states to it at all. If an entity never believed any of the consequences
of any of its apparent beliefs, we would be hard pressed to say why
we thought it had beliefs at all. The attribution of beliefs seems
to make sense only if we can attribute some rationality to the
'handling' of those beliefs by the entity that is said to have them.
A good deal of this seems to be true, and obviously true. But
I fail to see how it proves the two things Dennett wants it to prove,
that "intentional explanation and prediction cannot accommodate
either to breakdown or to less than optimal design" (Dennett, 1971,
p. 104) and that intentional psychology is fictional. I fail to see
how the fact that a modicum of rationality is necessary if a system
is to be an intentional system entails that it must have "perfect
rationality" (Ibid); nor how the failure of most things to be perfectly
rational implies that the intentional states we ascribe to them are
not real. Dennett (again) does not spell out his argument. Perhaps
his point is just that the existence of difficult or indeterminate cases
calls into question the genuineness of intentional states in general.
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But certainly the existence of indeterminate cases does not prove
that the determinate cases are fictional. That is just the old point
about vagueness: some people are not clearly either bald or not-
bald; and it does not follow from this that no one is clearly bald.
Dennett repeatedly says that the intentional stance requires
that intentional systems have "perfect rationality". But this just
seems to be false. When someone fails to be rational (in the sense
of not believing a logical consequence of its beliefs), we have a
plethora of intentional stance moves to cover the failure and keep
the person within the family of intentional systems: 'he couldn't
be expected to know', 'he feels very strongly about p', etc., etc.
Finally, there is a sense in which all predictions are norma-
tive. If I see something which I take to be, say, a typical comet,
and hence possessed of properties P, Q, and R; and if I derive
from the laws of astrophysics the law-like generalization that
comets with properties P, Q, and R will, when near the sun,
manifest property S; I shall say, this comet ought to manifest
property S when it gets near the sun. If it fails to manifest S,
I might question whether it really had properties P, Q, and R;
or I might look for another property T which affects the others;
or I might question whether the sun is constant in the relevant respect.
Now how is this normativeness and the sort of juggling we do when
the particular case fails to meet the norm, different from the
normativeness and juggling of the intentional stance?
Dennett seems to suggest that some special problem lies in
the fact that many intentional systems speak, and can evaluate
their own rationality. Dennett argues that the ascription of, for
example, beliefs to an entity is problematic because such ascription
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requires (1) that the believer have reasons for the belief, (2) that
more often than not beliefs are true, and (3) that a system's avowals
are the best source of evidence about its beliefs; and these are not
fully consistent.
Conflict arises, however-, whenever a person falls
short of perfect rationality, and avows beliefs that
either are strongly disconfirmed by the available
empirical evidence or are self-contradictory or
contradict avowals he has made. If we lean on the
myth that a man is perfectly rational, we must find
his avowals less than authoritative ("You can't mean--
understand--what you're saying!"); if we lean on his
"right" as a speaking Intentional system to have his
word accepted, we grant him an irrational set of
beliefs. Neither position provides a stable resting
place; for, as we saw earlier, Intentional explanation
and prediction cannot accommodate either to breakdown
or to less than optimal design, so there is no coherent
Intentional description of such an impasse.
(Dennett, 1971, p. 104)
Dennett's most visible argument is that intentional explanations and
predictions are particularly unstable (and in fact true only of some
perfectly rational system).
Now Dennett is surely correct that there must be some coherence
of perception, belief, and action, else we will cease to attribute
intentional states to an entity (see Shoemaker, 1974). Of course,
when problems of consistency begin to arise, we can change our
ascriptions to gain greater consistency. Part of Quine's and
Davidson' s objection to intentionality is precisely that too much
of this sort of juggling is possible. But that is not Dennett's worry.
He maintains that neither denial of avowal nor ascription of irrational
belief provides a "stable resting place". He is not at all clear as to
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what he means by "stable", but surely his criteria are too high.
We can attribute beliefs even though there is (to our minds) little
or negative evidence for a certain belief; someone's saying
'I believe because it is absurd' is in no obvious way evidence for
his not being an intentional system. Belief is not so strictly tied
to rational assessment of evidence as Dennett demands. It is a fact
that people do often hold beliefs without evidence, believe demonstrably
false things, and even have inconsistent beliefs; and act appropriately
with such beliefs. Lacking adequate reason, we can attribute belief
on the basis of need and consistency of putative belief and action.
Our normal constraints on belief ascription are remarkably loose;
an extremely high degree of instability is permissible.
Dennett' s claim that an intentional system's avowals are best
evidence for its beliefs is perhaps true as it stands. Eut Dennett
takes it to mean that an intentional system's avowals are un-
impeachable evidence, or are best evidence in all cases. And that
is surely false. People claim regularly to believe in all manner of
noble things and act utterly inconsistently with these sincere ex-
pressions of belief. We do not thereby question the viability of
describing their actions in intentional terms. We can ascribe other
beliefs, or ascribe desires or needs, or even inconsistent sets of
beliefs in order to make sense of their behavior and speech. We
do not assume that people are perfectly rational, nor do we assume
that what they say is unimpeachable evidence for their beliefs. The
impasse or conflict Dennett wants to find just does not exist.
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Question-Begging
Dennett' s more substantive argument that intentional psychology
is illegitimate is based on the claim that intentional psychology is
question-begging in some important sense. He argues any use of
intentional terms in the formulation of psychological theory posits
"little men" who understand or interpret or "read" the propositional
contents attributed to functional parts of the mind; these functional
parts are, then, in some respects, replicas of persons; and thus
their presence explains intentional states no more than Descartes'
little men explained vision. The use of the intentional idiom is to
be made unnecessary by
finding and analysing away these readers or compre-
henders; for, failing this, the theory will have among
its elements unanalyzed man-analogs endowed with
enough intelligence to read the signals, etc., and thus
the theory will postpone answering the major question:
what makes for intelligence?
Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because
it presupposes and does not explain rationality or
intelligence.
Skinner is right in recognizing that Intentionality can
be no foundation for psychology, and right also to look
for purely mechanistic regularities in the activities of
his siubjects, but there is little reason to suppose they
will lie on the surface in gross behavior. . . . Rather,
we will find whatever mechanistic regularities there
are in the functioning of internal systems whose design
approaches the optimal (relative to some ends). In
seeking knowledge of internal design our most promising
tactic is to take out intelligence loans, endow peripheral
and internal. events with content, and then look for
mechanisms that will function appropriately with such
"messages" so we can pay back the loans.
(Dennett, 1971, p. 99)
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Now these are strong and serious claims. I hope it is not
too pedantic to begin by asking precisely what question has been
begged. The error of begging the question is usually said to be
a property that pertains to arguments, not to whole sciences.
An argument begs the question when it suffers from what is
traditionally called the fallacy of petitio principii, namely including
(perhaps tacitly) the conclusion one wanted to prove as a premise
in the argument for that conclusion. Naturally enough, there is a
broader meaning to 'beg the question', as when someone tries to
give us a relatively uninformative answer, a 'dormative virtue'
sort of answer. But one doesn't usually hear it said that a special
science or the theories which apparently constitute the very heart
of that science are question-begging. We have to appreciate how
strong a claim Dennett is making in saying that intentional theories
"postpone answering the major question" of psychology, or is
saying that such theories are "vacuous". For Dennett is not just
saying that it would be good or interesting if some theory or special
science were able to explain the activity of mind without appealing
to intelligence or meaning. He is saying that any psychological
theory which does not do this is question-begging in a serious and
fundamental way.
Unfortunately Dennett never spells out precisely in what sense
intentional psychology is vacuous. He does not tell us in sufficient
detail what question has been begged. Apparently he will accept as
non-question-begging only those theories which give (vaguely)
reductive accounts of apparently intelligent behavior. Hle refers
with approval to the behaviorists' supposed success in showing
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that what appears to be intelligent behavior on the part of a pigeon
can be shown to consist of nothing but a sequence of conditioned
responses. Fully aware that such reductive accounts are notoriously
unsuccessful, Dennett argues that thE ( must be internal mechanisms
that account for the plasticity and rationality of behavior. Some of
Dennett's worry is now clear. If one wants a mechanistic or reduc-
tive account of animate behavior, behaviorism is a plausible first
step. Its failures motivate the view that an understanding of in-
ternal processing is necessary even for an account of overt behavior.
Internal processing may at first be characterized in functional or
even intentional terms; but ultimately (Dennett claims), these
functional parts of the mind (or nervous system) must have reductive
analyses into mechanistic systems. Otherwise the question "what
makes for intelligence?" has not yet been answered.
The trouble I see in Dennett' s portrait of the status of inten-
tionality in psychology is thiat it makes sense if one wants a reductive
account of intentionality; but it does not tell us why we should want
that, or accept only such an account as non-question-begging.
Consider the question "What makes for gravitational attraction?"
It is certainly not obvious that the only non-vacuous answer to this
question is an answer which makes no appeal to the notion of gravi-
tational attraction. The answer 'The natural proclivity of things
to move downwards' is vacuous, but Newton' s theory of gravitational
attraction does not seem to be. If it is considered question-begging
(because it does not explain what makes for gravitational attraction),
that only shows that a question-begging theory can be a good theory.
It is not obvious that intentional psychology must be like 'natural
proclivity' and not like Newton's theory. After all we want
psychology to provide not just mechanistic explanations of intelli-
gent behavior, but an explication of what intelligence is. In
good part this is what psychology has often done. There is a rich
history, particularly in Gestalt psychology, of attempts to describe
and define experimentally such notions as intelligence in a non-
vacuous way (See, for example, Kohler's Psychology of Apes).
In fact, it seems that psychology comes up with more interesting
and more reliable results the less it fetters itself with a reduc-
tionistic methodology. Considerable articulation of mental phenomena
is possible--in fact desirable--without appeal to mechanistic accounts.
Intentional psychology is not, then, question-begging the way an
argument may be; or rather, if it is question-begging, the conse-
quences to be draw-, from this fact are not so clear or devastating
as in the case of an argument. And similarly, intentional psychology
is not obviously vacuous in the way 'natural proclivity' or 'dormative
virtue' theories are.
Surely, then, the concern that Dennett must want to express
is not that all intentional psychology is seriously vacuous, nor
that intentional psychology cannot provide any explication of intelli-
gence. These targets are entirely too broad. I think his concern
is rather that even with explications of the notion of intelligence we
still explain behavior (or functions of the nervous system) in
intentional terms. I think we can see Dennett's point better if we
make a short detour. In the philosophy of action, the notion of a
basic act is now a commonplace: I warn the burglar by turning on
the light; I turn on the light by flipping the switch; I flip the switch
by moving my arm and fingers; I move my fingers by --
and here one does not have anything to say. When one reaches
this point where there is apparently nothing to be said as to how
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or by doing what X one did Y, one has found a basic act. Dennett's
concern is, I think, with what we can call basic mental acts. I
recognize a certain painting as a Cezanne by recognizing a certain
style. I recognize the style by noticing qualities like the color
properties of the palette, the nature of the brush stroke, etc.
I recognize the palette by noticing say, certain colors. But how
does one recognize a color? There is nothing one does (other than
looking, which at this point is not an illuminating answer) to recog-
nize a color. Psycho-physical research might be able to push the
questions further: one recognizes a color when one sees a color
and takes it to be similar to one represented in the memory.
Perhaps someday we will be able to go further. But I think we
have gone far enough to see what Dennett's objection is: no matter
how far we go, we have the person, or some functional part of the
person, noticing, remembering, recognizing, believing--being in
some intentional state or other. Dennett's claim is that this con-
tinued presence of intentional states makes psychological description
and explanation question-begging. When he says, then, that
psychology fails to explicate the notion of intelligence, he means
not that there is no intentional explication at all of intelligence,
but that psychological (and even psycho-physical) explications still
attribute intentional states to the functional parts of the cognitive
apparatus. We may find natural constraints on what a person or
animal can think or perceive, but we still explain much of the
behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, and perceptions we feel safe
in attributing to the creature. And we will surely find such con--
straints for functional parts of the nervous system. But still,
these animals or functional parts perceive, believe or desire.
And it is precisely this that Dennett finds question-begging.
According to Dennett, a non-question-begging psychology would
be one in which the basic mental acts were not intentional, but
purely mechanistic. ( Dennett is never fully explicit about
what he means by 'mechanistic'. As an approximation he suggests
that a process is mechanistic if it is Turing computable. ) Dennett's
point, then, is that there must be some basic psychological theory
which is not intentional; and that such a basic theory is non-question-
begging only if it is non-intentional.
But must there be a non-intentional psychology? The claim
that non-intentional basic mental processes exist is entirely hypo-
thetical. It could well turn out to be false. Dennett thinks it must
be true, but his argument is not a good one
If we relegate vitalist and interactionist hypotheses
to the limbo of last, desperate resorts, and proceed
on the assumption that human and animal behavioral
control systems are only very complicated denizens
of the universe, it follows that events within them,
characterized extensionally in the terms of physics
or physiology, should be susceptible to explanation
and prediction without any recourse to content, meaning,
or Intentionality. There should be possible some
scientific story about synapses, electrical potentials,
and so forth that would explain, describe and predict
all that goes on in the nervous system.
(Dennett, 1969, p. 78)
It is certainly true that we presume that physics and physiology
will explain all the physical or physiological events in human bodies.
But it doesn't follow from this that physics or physiology gives us
an explanation of all mental event types. If every event is a physical
event, physics will presumably give an explanation of all events in
the body and in the brain. But it does not follow from this that the
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laws of psychology are derivable from the laws of physics, nor
that we could give a physical account of psychological law or the
states and processes that constitute mental life. Event token
identity and the thesis that all events have an explanation in terms
of the laws of physics guarantees that intentional systems made
from matter have some kind of reductive analyses. But this kind
of reductive analysis, in which no psychological laws are derivable,
hardly guarantees that there will be an account of intelligence in
physics. Compositional reduction says nothing about the kinds or
levels of explanation the special sciences will devise. Dennett
seems to have made the traditional mistake of confusing the onto-
logical and epistemological theses of physicalism (see my
"Physicalism and Reduction"). The thesis that all events are
physical events does not give one a reductive relation of the sciences.
The same points just made about physics and psychology can
be reiterated for psychology and any other special science a physi-
calist might appeal to in a reduction claim--biology, neurology,
neurophysiology. If inter-theoretic reduction does not obtain,
there is no reason at all to assume that the laws of psychology
have a perspicuous representation in any reducing science. Every
event token of a psychological state may have an explanation in
the reducing science; but that does not show that the laws of mental
life have a reductive form in some reducing science. And even less
does it show that there are mechanistic forms of these laws in
psychology itself. If the nomic states of psychology are not defined
in neurology, a move from psychological to neurological law
simply leaves out of account those states and laws which define
the subject matter of psychology, unless there is inter-theoretic
reduction. The virtue of the traditional inter-theoretic reduction
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model is precisely that it gives one a way of explaining mental
events in non-mental terms without laying oneself open to the
charge of changing the subject in changing to a different theory.
In the traditional model, every nomic property of psychology is
shown to be at least coextensive with a neurological property.
But if inter-theoretic reduction does not obtain, the move to the
neurological level will lose us the very things we wish to explain.
And it might be precisely this that would happen when we move
from intentional to non-intentional explanations of mental phenomena.
Dennett's compositional analysis guarantees that every mental event
has a mechanistic explanation; but it is by no means obvious that
this explanation is part of psychology.
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Footnotes
1. See among others, Merleau-Ponty, 1942; Chisholm, 1957;
Taylor., 1964; Fodor, 1968.
2. See Ratnam, 1960; Putnam, 1966; and Block & Fodor, 1972.
3. I am by no means convinced that such a view of the states
ascribed in the special sciences is correct. Dennett does
not even present a thesis or argument; I am merely trying
to fill in some of the gaps in his presentation. )
4. This model is germinally present in Content and Consciousness:
the centralist makes his initial characterization
Intentional, describing the events to be related
in law-like ways using either ordinary, semi-
ordinary, or even entirely artificial Intentional
expressions. He then hopes that an adequate
physical basis can be found among the internal
states and events of the organism so that 'reduc-
tions' of Intentional sentences of the theory to
extensional sentences of the theory is possible.
(Dennett, 1969, pp. 41-42)
Applying this hierarchy to neurology, we can see now what
Dennett was trying to say with his "upgrading". Neurology
may very well have to begin by giving intentional characteri-
zations of brain states. Then, the hope is, these can be
D-reduced to complex design stance theories; which, in turn,
if anyone were interested, could be D-reduced to physical
theories.
5. See my earlier paper "Physicalism and Reduction".
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OTHER MINDS AND
THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
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I
The other minds problem is often expressed by the questions
"do we know and how do we know the thoughts and feelings of
another?" (Wisdom, 1946). Of course, in a perfectly ordinary
sense, we do sometimes know what the thoughts and feelings of
others are. And the ordinary ways we come to know are many:
by asking; by noticing all manner of behavioral facts--facial ex-
pression, gestures, actions, etc.; by determining the circum-
stances of the other's life, from the most immediate stimuli to
general conditions such as health; and most commonly by some
combination of these. But Wisdom's questions have a radical
sense. For what usually concerns philosophers when they worry
about other minds is how we justify, or how we could justify, our
various assertions about the minds or mental states of others.
Requests for justification of such an assertion, e. g., that Jon'es is
depressed , will normally call forth an answer like 'because he
has been a friend for years and I can tell his moods.' The
skeptical concern, however, is that all these sorts of ordinary
answers presuppose the more general claim that such answers
are sufficient justification for the claim that you know that Jones
is depressed. What the skeptic wants to know is what justifies our
tacit assumption that our ordinary justifications are good justifica-
tions, or justifications at all.
The nature of evidence and justification is an issue throughout
philosophy. But the other minds skeptic is worried that there is
some special problem about our assertions about the minds of others,
and about the justification of these assertions. Skeptics typically
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express their worries or doubts in arguments designed to under-
mind our faith in the ordinary assertions and justifications. And
these arguments are designed to show that there is some distinctive
problem about our putative knowledge of the minds of others. The
arguments seem intended (in part) to show that there is more of a
problem, or a different sort of problem, with the justification of
assertions about the minds or mental states of others than about
the physical states of others. This greater problem of inter-
subjective availability is instantiated in claims like 'only Jones
can know what mental state he is in', or in arguments to the effect
that our ways of justifying our claims about Jones' mental states
are all much weaker or epistemically less secure than Jones' way;
whereas we are all in the same epistemic relation to the states of
physical objects. We shall examine claims and arguments like
this shortly. But it is worth lingering on this point, that skeptics--
and often those who answer them as well--have insisted that there
is indeed some special problem about the minds or mental states
of others.
The general sort of argument that philosophers have given
to show that there is a problem about knowledge of the mental
states of others which does not apply equally to knowledge of their
bodies runs something like this.
(1) Only person P feels the pain he has.
This, or something like it, is often taken to be a necessary truth
(Ayer, 1953; Plantinga, 1967). (1) is generalized to other mental
states, e. g.,
(1') Only person P has the depression P has.
From these it is inferred (perhaps illicitly) that
(2) Only P can observe the mental state he has
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or
(3) Only P has direct, non-inferential knowledge of his
mental states
And from (2) or (3) it is infer" that
(4) If I know about ,,xcson P's mental states, it is not by
observing them, unless I am P
And from this it is inferred that
(5) Since I don't observe P's mental states (unless I am P),
I can justify claims to knowledge about them only by
inference from what I do observe
And from this it is concluded
(6) There is a significant assymetry between the justification
of one's claims about one's own mental states and the
justification of one's claims about the mental states of
others.
This sort of argument is common to skepticism and to the
most common response to it, the argument from analogy. Those
who argue for the argument from analogy make claims like (2)
through (6), just as skeptics do. They disagree about whether
we do have warranted knowledge of the mental states of others,
but they seem to agree in thinking that (2)-(6) are true. It is not
their disagreement that interests me, by rather their apparent
agreement about the skeptical portrait of our epistemic relation
to the mental states of overs as revealed in statements like (2)
through (6). My primary concern in this paper will be to show
that the argument from analogy (or at least some widely accepted
versions of it) does accept this portrait, and to present reasons for
thinking that this portrait is seriously in error. Its mistakes center
upon two complex and problematic notions, that of a mental state,
and that of observation, which we shall examine carefully. I shall
not try to show that there is no special problem about the epistemic
status of the mental states of others. But I do hope to show that
the standard arguments used by skeptics and analogists alike are
not only unsound, but contribute seriously to the confusions which
beset the philosophical understanding of minds and persons.
If I succeed at both my tasks, that of demonstrating the funda-
mental acceptance of the skeptical portrait by analogists and that
of giving good reasons for thinking that portrait in error, I think
we will have found the source, or a source, of the vague but strongly
felt disaffection with the analogical position. For I will have shown
that those who argue from analogy really accept debatable claims--
in fact false claims--made by skeptics about other minds. The
disaffection lies, then, with the skeptical portrait itself.
q., %
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II
ANALOGY
I'm not going to discuss the argument from analogy, because
there really is no such thing. That is, there is no one argument
which is the argument from analogy; rather, there is a family of
arguments that have certain features in common, or at least a
family resemblance. I will discuss some of these general features.
For what concerns me is not proper formulation, but why it is that
various authors have thought that there is a need for an argument
from analogy and why they think an argument from analogy answers
their questions or resolves their doubts. I hope to get at the doubts
that generate concern about knowledge of other minds by studying
what so many have thought was a good or adequate answer to these
doubts.
Let us begin with a simple formulation of the argument from
analogy and see what conception of the problem (or a problem) of
other minds manifests itself in it. John Stuart Mill argues:
I conclude that other human beings have feelings
like me, because, first, they have bodies like me,
which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent
condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they
exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in
my own case I know by experience to be caused by
feelings. I am conscious in myself of a series of
facts connected by an uniform sequence, of which
the beginning is modifications of my body, the middle
is feelings, the end is outward demeanor. In the
case of other human beings I have the evidence of my
senses for the first and last links of the series, but
not for the intermediate link. I find, however, that
the sequence between the first and last is as regular
and constant in those other cases as it is in mine.
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In my own case I know that the first link produces
the last through the intermediate link, and could
not produce it without. Experience, therefore,
obliges me to conclude that there must be an inter-
mediate link; which must either be the same in others
as in myself, or a different one: I must either believe
them to be alive, or to be automatons: and by believing
them to be alive, that is, by supposing the link to be of
the same nature as in the case of which I have experience,
and which is in all other respects similar, I bring other
human beings, as phenomena, under the same generali-
zations which I know by experience to be the true theory
of my own existence.
(Mill, 1889)
1. One cannot but be struck by the simplicity of Mill's argu-
ment. One might well have thought that the problem of other minds
and any solution to it would be rather subtle. The simplicity of
Mill's argument from analogy arises, in part, from a good deal of
abstraction that the reader must contend with unaided. For
example, what counts as a relevant type of behavior must be very
broad. If it is said that people in pain behave 'the way' I do when
I am in pain, this 'way' must obviously cover a multitude of be-
haviors (and styles of expressing them), for obviously people in
the same mental state often behave very differently indeed. Unless,
on the other hand, there is some restriction on types of behavior,
the argument could be literally analytic because there will always
be some similarities between any two behaviors; but if that occurs,
the argument will fail simply because I cannot correlate my pain
state with yours, rather than with, say, your grief state. And
obviously, the constraints on types must be precise enough that
the argument is accurate. And it's not obvious that this can be
done, or done easily. What distinguishes your pain from your grief
may be evident to me not from your immediate behavior (e. g.,
crying) or even your immediate introspectabl e mental state as
you report it to me, but from beliefs about the circumstances
or causes of your behavior rather than the behavior itself, or even
from the relationship of this grief-behavior to other behaviors
and mental states.
2. Perhaps the most surprising (and philosophically dis-
turbing) feature of Mill' s argument is that all the different mental
states we ascribe to others are compressed or reduced to feelings,
or simply left out of account. The having of an intention or desire
is surely a mental state, but it is only in an awkward and inaccurate
sense that they could be called feelings. Discussions of the problem
of other minds often use truncated accounts of mental states. The
focus is always upon sensations, feelings, mental imagery, and
the like--the sorts of mental states which have introspectable
content, or qualia, or some sort. The focus on mental states
with introspectable content has several sources. It is sometimes
said to be merely "pragmatic" (Aune, 1961), but we shall see that
in fact many of the skeptical arguments will work, or even look
like they work, only with those mental states which do have intro-
spectable content. We shall see shortly just how problematic
this emphasis can become.
Correlative with the selective attention to feelings comes
a tacitly regimented notion of "outward demeanor". Mill clearly
believes that the epistemic justification of 'I observed that S was
in mental state M' is different from the justification of 'I observed
that S's body was in physical state P'. The feelings of others are
not, according to Mill, something for which "I have the evidence
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of my senses. " I do, according to Mill, have the evidence of my
senses for the "outward demeanor" of others (what we would call
behavior) and for the "outward signs" of the feelings I do not sense.
But now obviously these "outward signs", these "modifications of
the body", must be such that their presence is not sufficient for
me to infer analytically that another person feels or thinks, else
there will be no problem. Writhing in pain, for example, cannot
be one of the observable modifications of the body, because one
can infer from 'S is writhing in pain' to 'S is in the mental state
of pain'. Writhing itself will presumably be observable, it being
an outward sign of pain. But can all mental states be so nicely
divided up into mental state proper and outward sign? What about
something like being depressed? It is not at all obvious that 'Jones
is depressed' is an assertion about Jones' conscious state or
feelings. To say that someone is depressed is not to ascribe
some particular state of consciousness, for people feel or experi-
ence many different things when they are depressed. Naturally
if someone is overtly and consciously depressed, we think they
must be in some introspectable mental state or other; but this
feeling alone is not what defines depression. It seems likely that
some of the behavioral features of depression are not "outward
signs" of some inner state, but the state itself. The expressions
of the face, the listless gestures, the withdrawal from one's
common activities and projects do not seem to be mere outward
signs of depression in the way the writhing is for pain. Many of
our descriptions of persons do not fall easily into either the category
of feeling or the category of outward sign of a feeling. Feeling may
not be all that there is to mental states; and many of the things we
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consider descriptions of behavior may not be mentality neutral.
As we shall see, the skeptical-analogical insistence on a separa-
tion of inner states of consciousness and outward states of behavior
gives us not only an incorrect account of mental states, but of
behavior as well.
Another trap lies in the conflating claims about what is inward
and what is outward with a claim about the causal status of mental
states. If based on a causal claim alone, the argument from
analogy is to be an argument to the effect that we know what causes
the behavior of others because these causes can justifiably be said
to be similar to what causes the similar behavior in our own case.
Since statements of causal relations presumably express the rela-
tionship of distinct entities or events, a causal account of mental
states and behavior is committed to the view that mental events
and behavioral events are distinct sorts of things. This causal
account of mental states is inconsistent with at least some forms
of behaviorism and therefore motivates some worry about the
epistemic justification of other minds claims, but it is not by itself
sufficient to justify the extreme skepticism some find plausible.
The importance of distinguishing the causal claim from the obser-
vation claim lies in the fact that if they are compounded, one gets
the claim that mental states are the unobserved causes of behavior
(unobserved except by the person in the mental state, that is).
This permits one to use the dualistic language of inner states and
"outward demeanor" without committing oneself to a dualism of
substances. But at the same time it burdens the causal claim with
a claim about the special un-observability of the mental states of
others. The claims are not the same, nor do they, without argument,
stand in any logical relation. In many causal relations we do
observe both the cause and the effect, though we do not observe
the causal relation itself: the first billiard ball causes the second
to move; Jones' argumentativeness spoiled the dinner party; the
cold rain forced the bathers to seek shelter. Sometimes the effect
is unobservable (in some sense) when the cause is observable:
the injection killed the germs. Of course, there is a variety of
cases in which the cause is not observed but the effect is, and we
reason analogically to the presence of the cause: the presence of
another planet caused the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
Now all of these cases need refinement around the notion of obser-
vation. Nonetheless there is no reason to assume a priori that
because mental states cause behavior they are unobservable in
some important sense. Too many have made this assumption.
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III
A
Now that we have a rough idea of the skeptical view and the
analogical response, it is time to see how the confusions and
problems I have hinted at manifest themselves in some typical
skeptical and analogical arguments.
Claims about the problematic status of our knowledge of other
minds typically begin in one of two ways, either by contrasting the
entailment relations of statements about our own minds with those
about the minds of others, or by articulating the unobservability
of the mind s of others. Of course, the two ways are often mixed,
but it is easy enough to separate them.
The first method relies on the apparently significant differ-
ence between, on the one hand
(7) If I believe I am in mental state M, I am in mental state M
and
(8) If I am in mental state M, I believe (or know) I am in
mental state M,
and, on the other hand
(9) If I believe you are in mental state M, you are in mental
state M
and
(10) If you are in mental state M, I believe you are.
Now (9) and (10) are grotesquely false, whereas (7) and (8) are
close to the truth, and this difference is used to show that we have
privileged access to our own minds. But while (7) and (8) may
appear to be true at first glance, they are not. Both are surely
false if we consider the full range of mental states. I may believe
I am happy that Jones got a promotion, but in fact I may be sad,
jealous, or resentful. I may sincerely insist that I am not angry
about something, but in fact be very angry. And someone else
may see very well that I am angry even though I am unaware of it.
It is only with sensations and feelings that (7) and (8) may be
true. That is, it is certainly arguable that
(11) If I believe I am in pain, I am in pain
and
(12) If I am in pain, I believe I am in pain
are true. I am not entirely convinced that they are. I am not
sure that the notion of repressed pain--as in the psychosomatic
theory of Ida Rolf--is incoherent or nonsensical. Or, to take a
more familiar case, one can, in athletic competition, suddenly
'feel the pain that was there all along' when the competition ends.
And I am not sure how to explain cases where, under stress, one
(thinks one) feels pain, but as soon as the general tension subsides,
the feeling of pain disappears. These are subtle and important cases,
and I do not know how those who argue for this epistemic privacy
will explain such obvious cases. But let us not press this point here.
For another issue, frequently overlooked, arises. Even if (11) and
(12) are true, it does not follow from this that (7) and (8) are (as
many have thought, Mill, 1889 ; Ayer, 1953). One could not claim
that other minds are problematic on the basis of (11) and (12) alone,
all they show is the problematic status of sensations and feelings.
But it surely would be curious to hear that there was no problem
with all the other sorts of mental states--intentions, thoughts, hopes,
desires, wants, beliefs, moods, emotions, et al. Many formulations
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of skepticism and the argument from analogy speak explicitly
about a general problem with the full range of mental states
(Ayer, 1953; Wisdom, 1946; Planginga, 1967). Yet the crux of
most arguments is around states with introspectable content, such
as sensations. As we have just seen, the entailment relations of
(7), (8), (11), and (12) do not support the claim that all mental states
are problematically private. How could such a glaring mistake be
so repeatedly made? The answer lies, I think, in a confusion about
what the terms 'mental state' or 'mental event' are to refer to. We
use them to refer both to mental states proper, and to the feelings
one might typically have while in a certain mental state. (I shall
use 'mental state' the first way. ) The role of experiential content
in mental states is a complex one. There are many mental states
one can have with no introspectable content at all-- intentions for
example. Hope is an interesting case because one can hope with
no feelings whatsoever (as in 'I hope they are on time for dinner')
or with very strong feelings indeed ('I hope the plane doesn't crash').
These sorts of considerations can easily be extended to the other
sorts of mental states. It becomes rather obvious that whatever
the role of introspectable content may be, mental states will not
generally be defined by their introspectable content. Hope, for
example, would probably be defined in terms of a positive attitude
towards a propositional object (what one hopes for). How a 'positive
attitude' is to be understood is a mystery at this point, but it will
surely not be understood as some introspectable feeling. The
particular feelings that commonly go with hope in our culture
might well be considered irrelevant to the definition of hope or
the identification of particular hopes, just as muscle twitches in
the throat, or one's awareness of these twitches, is not considered
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part of the definition of thought or thinking, as several late 19th-
early 20th century psychologists believed.
And now the question returns, is the other minds problem a
problem about mental states, or is it a problem about the intro-
spectable contents of mental states? The plausible historical
hypothesis is that it began as the former and has drifted towards
the latter. The modern skeptic or analogist can easily claim that
he is concerned with the problem of introspectable content, and
not with the old problem of mental states. This move is certainly
a workable one, but only at a considerable cost. For the scope of
the problem becomes immensely restricted. The problem of other
minds, it turns out, does not concern the privacy of mental states,
but the apparent privacy of the introspectable contents of some
mental states. (The temptation is to try to slide from the restricted
problem to the general one. Ayer takes the full trip: He insists
there "must remain a sense in which it is necessarily true that
experiences are private and necessarily true also that one cannot
know the thoughts and feelings of another. . ." (1953, p. 352).
Building a problem of other minds from privacy considerations is,
then, a difficult task at best. The standard notion of privacy will
tolerate only sensations and feelings as plausible candidates for
private mental states, and even with these the case is problematic.
BConsideration of the distinction between mental state and
content of introspection is required with the second battery of
skeptical arguments intended to cast doubt on the security of our
beliefs about the mental states of others. These arguments deal
with the problematic notion of observation. Plantinga claims
(Pl) We cannot observe the thoughts and feelings of
another; so we cannot determine by observation
that another is in pain
(P2) While a person can observe another's behavior
and circumstances, he cannot perceive another's
mental states.
(P3) 'S determines by observation that S' is in pain
only if S is the same person as S*' expresses
a necessary truth.
(Plantinga, 1967, pp. 188-189)
We must begin with a point of clarification. Plantinga discusses,
on the one hand 'determine by observation that', 'observe that',
and 'see that'; and, on the other hand, 'observe ' where
the fillers are non-sentential. It is one thing to claim that we
cannot observe the thoughts and feelings of another person and
something else to claim that we cannot observe that another person
is in some mental state. As it stands (P1) is a glaring non-sequitur,
for we surely can observe that someone is in pain.
It is safe to assume, then, that what Plantinga wants to do
is to differentiate 'observe ' from 'observe that' in its
ordinary uses, and both of these from 'observe that' (and its
synonym 'determine by observation') in the technical sense he
wishes to create. This technical sense will be such that statements
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like 'I observed that he was in pain' will necessarily be false
because I cannot observe his pain. It is easy enough to see why
any philosopher might want to regiment the uses of 'observe that',
for it is notoriously broad in ordinary language, being used to
introduce both the results of simple observation, as in 'I observed
that he had red hair', and the results of inductive reasoning as in
'I observed that he was a Frenchman from his distinctive accent'.
Plantinga's technical sense for 'observe that' is intended to restrict
it s usage to those cases such that an 'observe that' statement is
true only if the corresponding 'observe ' statement is true.
For example, 'I observed that he had red hair' will be permissible
because 'I observed his red hair' is true. 'I observed that he was
a Frenchman from his distinctive accent' will not be permissible
because 'I observed his French-ness' cannot be true. And similarly,
'I observed that he was in pain' will not be true because 'I observed
his pain' is necessarily false (or meaningless). The obvious intent
of this legislated sense of 'observe that' is to enforce a putative
distinction between observation and inference which 'observe that'
tends to obscure. Plantinga wants to argue then, that 'I observed
that he was in pain' is justified by inference, and is not a genuine
observation sentence because 'I observed his pain' is either
necessarily false or meaningless.3
It would seem to be part of Plantinga's position that a rigid
distinction of observation and inference can be made, and that it
can be placed in such a way that one's knowledge of one's own
mental states is observational (or at least can be observational),
while knowledge of the mental states of others is inferential.
Claims like these pervade work on other minds. But we know
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that the first claim is dubious indeed: it attempts to make a
distinction that cannot (so far as we know) be made. Observation
and inferential knowledge do not seem to be mutually exclusive
categories. It seems fairly clear that our knowledge of things
we do observe is in part inferential. I can certainly be said to
see the drinking glass in front of me. But to see that something
is a glass is to see that it would probably break under certain
typical conditions. Such knowledge of the properties of glasses
is surely inferential. A good deal of our knowledge of the things
we commonly see is likewise inferential. If one wants some rigid
dichotomy of observation and inference one must, apparently,
claim that what we commonly think we observe--such as glasses--
we do not, in the strict sense, observe, for the very reason that
our knowledge of such things is inferential. If true observation
comes unpolluted by inferential knowledge, we must observe very
little indeed. It seems unlikely- -given the history of failures--
that this search for what is purely observable will produce usable
results. And it seems obvious that this genuine observation will
be so rudimentary a perceptual act that the observation/inference
dichotomy will not place the physical states of others among the
things we observe and the mental states of others among the things
whose existence and nature we infer but do not observe. For
knowledge of physical objects and their physical properties is,
as we just saw, inferential.
Presumably then Plantirga wants to claim, not that obser-
vation and inference are mutually exclusive categories, but only
that our knowledge of the mental states of others is inferential,
whereas knowledge of our own is not (or, not always). This
110
seems to be the import of several of Plantinga's examples.
Consider one case that Plantinga refers to, where a physicist
says 'I saw that mu-mesons had entered the cloud chamber' and
'I saw the mu-mesons in the cloud chamber'. Both of these would
seem to be acceptable usage. Nonetheless, it is evident that
knowing that a mu-meson has entered the cloud chamber is justi-
fied in part by certain inferences. It would be preposterous to
say that the physicist knows about the existence of mu-mesons
from casual observation. At some point in time mesons were
hypothetical entities whose existence was postulated in the con-
text of a certain theory; and still a considerable part of what it is
to be a mu-meson is revealed only by theory. Observing a cloud
chamber will not allow us to see mesons unless we know what to
look for (or, if we see them, we do not know we see them). Once
the theory is known, however, we may justify the claim that a
mu-meson is present by appeal to the simple claim that 'I saw it'
or the like. But even when we observe a particular thing, be it
a meson or anything else, we justify our claim that it is the thing
we take it to be by appealing to previous experience, theory, and
inference. Our seeing is informed or knowledgeable and in so
far as it is, we can be asked to justify the knowledge claim im-
plicit in an act of seeing. That it was a mu-meson that I saw begs
for justification that will surely rely on inference, despite the fact
that I truly see the meson.
Plantinga's point, then, is that just as our knowledge of
mesons is mediated by a theory of physics, so our knowledge
of the mental states of others is mediated by a theory which
justifies our knowledge claims about the mental states of others
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inferentially (whether or not we observe these mental states).
But, he seems to argue, we can know about our own mental states
without inference. We need inference for knowledge of the mental
states of others, but not in our own.
Now is it true that our knowledge of our own mental states
is non-inferential? Obviously I may infer from my own behavior
that I am, say, jealous or depressed. What Plantinga is asserting
though, is that in addition to inferential knowledge of our own
mental states, we have non-inferential knowledge as well. But
what is this non-inferential knowledge? It is true that one does
not need to infer that one is in pain to be in pain, .but it does not
follow from this that one knows that it is pain, or knows what pain
is, without inference. The case is similar to the case of seeing
what is in fact a mu-meson without knowing that it is a mu-meson.
Infants must, for example, learn that certain states of discomfort
are called 'pain' and others 'need', 'desire', 'fear', etc.; and
presumably they do this by making certain inferences (among other
things). I may feel intensely angry; but it seems likely that I would
justify the assertion that it is anger I feel with inferences about my
previous mental states and behavior and from what others have said
and done when I have been angry before. I may indeed genuinely
observe the presence of my own mental states, and be subjectively
most certain of their presence, but that does not show that my
knowledge of them is non-inferential.
Perhaps Plantinga would say that we have misunderstood
what he means by non-inferential knowledge. Perhaps he would
say that all he means by non-inferential knowledge is that privacy
claims like
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(11) If I believe I am in pain, I am in pain
and
(12) If I am in pain, I believe I am in pain
are true, whereas
(9*) If I believe you are in pain, you are in pain
and
(10 ) If you are in pain, I believe you are in pain
are false. But we have been here before. These are part of the
typical skeptical-analogical claims about privacy. We were told,
however, that there were other sorts of claims and arguments--
built upon the notion of observation- -which supported skeptical
claims about the mental states of others. These arguments
cannot collapse into reiteration of the entailment relations which
generate privacy worries, else the whole supposed problem of
observation is lost.
At this point the skeptic or analogist may well want to with-
draw the claim that a distinction between observation and inference
bifurcates one's own mental states from those of others. Appeal
might be made instead to ordinary speech and experience to show
that these reveal at least a rough and ready distinction of observed
and not-observed, and thereby reveal something problematic
about the epistemic status of our beliefs about the mental states of
others. This is perhaps what Plantinga intends when he asserts
(P3), which entails that we do not observe the mental states of
others, but do observe our own. Plantinga thinks this letter claim
obviously true, but I do not. I find it difficult to determine in just
what sense the mental states of others are supposed to be unobser-
vable. It is certainly true that I can observe that someone is in a
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certain mental state. And it is not at all obvious that
(13) I observed his mental state
is necessarily false, whereas
(14) I observed my own mental state
may be true. Now (13) is certainly false if it implies that when
you feel pain, I feel pain, too. But it doesn't. (13) contains the
problematic notion of observation, but does not say anything about
telepathy or concomitant experience. There certainly are mental
states for which (13) is true: In an ordinary sense of 'observe',
it does seem correct to say 'I observed the cat's intentions',
'I observed the children's delight when they saw Santa Claus',
and the like. In an ordinary sense of 'observe', we do observe
intentions, moods, feelings, all sorts of mental states. When we
observe and speak in this way, we do not mean that we are re-
porting the presence of some independently existing entity, say
depression, that has settled on your mind. Mental states are
states; they are not the sorts of things that exist independently of
persons: they cannot exist (and ipso facto cannot be observed)
without there being something one takes to be the animate creature
having them. We do not see the depression separate from the
person and the complex of behavior in which it is embodied. But
mental states are not alone in this; the same is true of physical
dimensions, smiles, laps, and other features of persons. But
it certainly doesn't follow from this dependency of mental states
that we cannot be said to observe the mental states of others, for
it is certainly true that we can see the other's smile. So it cer-
tainly shouldn't follow from this existence dependency that, say,
being depressed or being in pain are private mental states which
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only our unfortunate friend can observe. Yet this is exactly what
Plantinga seems to imply when he compares one's observing one's
own pain and observing someone else's red hair (p. 188). He
seems to argue 'I observe that S is in pain' can be known to be
true by observation only if 'I observe S's pain' can be known to
be true by observation; and that will be the case only if we can
observe the pain without observing S (as we can observe S's hair
on the floor of the barber shop).
The skeptical trick is to get us to worry about 'observe S's
pain'. We are supposed to think that this is some metaphysical
oddity, barely conceivable. But the same supposed problem can
be generated with 'observe S's posture' or 'observe S's smile'
or 'observe S's rotundity'. The relevant notion is not, however,
'observe S's pain', but 'observe S's being in pain'. Our concern
is the observability of states of persons, not the qualia which may
be present to the person in that state. The skeptic gets us to
think about these introspectable qualia as though only the appre-
hension of qualia could count for 'observing S's being in pain'.
The reason the skeptic so easily confuses us (and himself) is that
we are seduced into interpreting 'observe S's pain' on the model
of 'feel S's pain', which we know only works when we are S. Once
one has accepted the notion that 'observing S's pain' is to be
analyzed as 'feeling S's pain', the skeptical case is well on the
road to success.
Now we can see from a new angle how dangerous it is to
accept the idea that mental states are defined by their intro-
spectable contents. For once that is accepted, it is easy to
conclude that only apprehending that content as the other does
countas observing the other's being in the mental state which
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contains that qualia. At this point, it becomes plausible to
imagine mental states as mysterious sorts of things, curiously
like ordinary things in that they are observable, but very unlike
normal things in that the mental states of S are observable only
by S. Now if the mental states of others are thought of as objects
only he can observe, then the mental states of others surely
would present awesome epistemological problems. But we don't
have to imagine they are like this, for they aren't. This intui-
tion--that the mental states of others are private objects, objects
only he can observe--seems to lie at the heart of the skeptical-
analogical portrait of mental states. 4
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My attack on the skeptical-analogical portrait of our
epistemic relation to the mental states of others has focused
first on its implicit conception of what mental states are, and
then on its problematic claims about observation. It is easy
enough to see how the two strands of my critique can be woven
together.
Skeptics and analogists typically discuss feelings and sensa-
tions and not the full range of mental states. If confronted with
the problem of the lack of (or irrelevance of) introspective con-
tent or the problem of the apparent observability-in-others of
the other types of mental states, the standard move is to try to
separate the feeling of or the feeling in the mental state, and run
the arguments on this feeling, rather than on the mental state
itself. That is, the skeptic can argue that we say 'I observed his
feeling depressed' and not 'I observed his depressed feeling' and
use the difference to argue that we do not really observe the de-
pression, that we only observe the "outward signs" of the depressed
feeling, which, because it is the other's experience, we cannot
experience ourselves. Feelings have the same virtue sensations
have, namely that there is often a relatively definite and relatively
uniform introspective content. And where there is introspective
content, it is easy to say that this content is the mental state and
to infer from this that anything other than experiencing this content
will only an "outward sign" of the having of the content. No one
today would make the error of thinking that all mental states could
be defined as introspectable items. (We should remember that
the other minds problem seems to have arisen at the very time
when psychology was thought to be the science of experiential
states and when introspection was considered the fundamental
method, if not the only method, of psychology. ) But it is also
an error to assume that because I cannot observe your intro-
spectable items (when such there are), I cannot be said to observe
the mental state, the experience of which for you is in part that
introspectable item. I can't observe your pain if that means ob-
serving the qualia you sense; but the relevant notion is that of
observing someone's being in pain, not observing the pain.
The assumption that it is underlies the common slide from the
point that I can't feel your pain to the claim that I can't observe
your being in pain. An appeal to a (tacit) introspective definition
of mental states seems to be the source of Plantinga's claim that
(P2) While a person can observe another's behavior
and circumstances, he cannot perceive another's
mental states.
(p. 188)
But Plantinga plays with a stacked deck. For him, 'observe a
mental state' means 'to come into contact with an introspectable
item'. Hence 'observe the mental state of another' means 'come
into contact with the introspectable item of another' which (barring
magical telepathy)is impossible. If knowledge of other minds re-
quires observing the introspectable qualia of the other's con-
sciousness, the problem of other minds does look insoluble.
But there is every reason to think that observational knowledge
of the mental states of others does not require feeling the intro-
spectable contents of the mental states of others.
118
Now of course the introspectionist is going to ask, 'In what
does the observing the mental state of another consist, if not in
the having of (duplicates of) their feelings ? The answer is just
that in observing the person--the behavior, the face, the flow of
expressions and actions--we observe the mental states. As long
as we are beguiled by introspective definitions we keep looking
for a special process or special mode of access to the minds of
others. But if we don't demand introspective definitions, we
don't need any. We don't need a special process to observe the
smile, the muscular tone, the rhythm of action, and in observing
these, we observe the mental state itself. The animate body is
an appearance of the mental state. The feeling (if such there be)
is how it usually appears to the person who has the mental state,
and the behavior is how it appears to others. In both of these
the mental state itself is revealed, just as in observing two very
different sides of an object, two persons see the object itself.
This view is what Strawson seems to be asserting when he
writes:
. . . we speak of behaving in a depressed way (of
depressed behavior) and also of feeling depressed
(of a feeling of depression). One is inclined to argue
that feelings can be felt, but not observed, and be-
havior can be observed, but not felt, and that therefore
there must be room here to drive in a logical wedge.
But the concept of depression spans the place where
one wants to drive it. We might say, in order for
there to be such a concept as that of X' s depression,
the depression which X has, the concept must cover
both what is felt, but not observed, by X and what
may be observed, but not felt, by others than X (for
all values of X). But it is perhaps better to say:
X's depression is something, one and the same thing,
which is felt but not observed by X and observed but
not felt by others than X.
(Strawson, 1959, p. 105)
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I take it that Strawson is suggesting just what I suggested, namely
that a mental state token is intersubjectively available in that it, the
mental state token itself, is felt by the person who has it and
observed by those who do not feel it. A mental state tokein is,
then, an intersubjectively available entity. The nature of its
intersubjective availability is different from the intersubjective
availability of, say, tables and chairs, because of the frequent
assymetry of feeling and observing from first to third person;
but that in itself does not seem sufficient to pro-, - that it is not
intersubjectively available, This issue would seem to be the
central issue of the other minds problem. For if 'X's depression'
refers to an entity which is available (observable or feelable) 'nly
to X, then some form of the problem of other minds could always
be generated. But if ' X s depression' refers to an entity which is
intersubjectively available, then the other minds problem, as
originally formulated, cannot get a foothold.
It is worth noting why it is that Strawson (and I) are driven
to the point of saying odd-sounding things like "X's depression is
something, one and the same thing, which is felt but not observed
by X and observed but not felt by others than X", or "X's depression'
refers to an entity which is intersubjectively available. . ."
I have just argued that mental states should not be thought of as
independently existing things to which persons stand in some special
relationship of ownership. When then appeal here to locutions
which apparently reify mental states ? The answer is that skepti-
cism has played such havoc with the natural locutions like 'I
observed that he was depressed'. Strawson would, I think, like
to say simply that it is X's being depressed or the fact that X is
depressed which is, in a non-technical sense, observable. But
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skeptics typically complain that these locutioi , and the experi-
ences they express, obscure the fact that mental states are mIln-
observable in an epistemologically significant sense. The skeptic
may allow that X's being depressed is, in the ordinary sensr.
observable; but he will assert also that the depression itself is
hidden from view. Therefore we are driven to assert that mental
states are themselves not unobservable in the way skeptics claim
they are. The point of our reifying usage is not to make it out
that mental states are independently existing things like tables
and chairs, but only that they are genuinely observable features
of persons. Reifying locutions are always odd with features or
properties, be those properties mental or not (e. g., 'I observed
his rotundity'); but it is necessary to use them to make it clear
that mental states are observable features of sentient creatures.
The skeptic attacks our more neutral locutions, such as 'I observed
that he was depressed'. The skeptic has cast what is an
illegitimate doubt on our normal 'observe-that' expressions, and
thus we use somewhat reifying expressions to say that even allowing
doubt about 'observe-that' expressions, the case for the observa-
bility of mental states can still be made.
The Strawsonian view can easily be misunderstood. Many
will interpret the claim that one can observe the mental states
of others in their behavior as an obscure way of putting some
logical behaviorist claim to the effect that sentences ascribing
mental states are synonymous with or entailed by sentences
ascribing behavioral or dispositional states. And Strawson gives
credence to such interpretations by saying dangerously vague
things like
What I have said is that one ascribes P-predicates
to others on the strength of observation of their
behavior; and that the behavior-criteria one goes
on are not just signs of t!he presence of what is meant
by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically
ade quate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate.
(Strawson, 1959, pp. 102-103)
One could interpret this as making a behaviorist claim. And
we know that logical behaviorism is false. So then those sympa-
thetic to skepticism will say that Strawson's view about the obser-
vability of the mental states of others depends on a demonstrably
false claim. So we are forced, says the skeptic, to choose between
logical behaviorism and the skeptical view that we cannot observe
the mental states of others; since logical behaviorism is false,
the choice is obvious.
I don't believe that we have to make this bitter choice, nor
that the behavioristic reading of Strawson' s theory is correct.
What we need, and what I think the skeptic is right to demand, is
some idea of what a non-behavioristic interpretation of the theory
looks like. That will be the task of the next section, where I hope
to show that our ordinary experience and description of behavior
is considerably more mentalistic than behaviorists constraints
can permit; and once it is understood that relatively mentalistic
features of behavior are observable, the notion of observing the
mental states of others becomes considerably less obscure. I
hope it is clear now, though, why this is worth pursuing: It is
generally assumed that logical behaviorist accounts of mental
states are false. It is also generally accepted that in seeing an
aspect of a physical object, one sees the object itself; and this is
held to be true even though object statements are not synonymous
122
with sense-datum statements. But it is also commonly accepted
(by philosophers) that in observing another's behavior, one does
not observe the mental state of another. A good many philosophers
have assumed that this assymetry is guaranteed. But given the
failure of the various arguments used in effect to demonstrate this
very point, it would seem to be a wiser course to try to articulate
(if possible) the way in which the mental states of others are
observable. Theories of perception are no longer thought to be
caught in the dilemma of sense-datum theory or thing-in-itself
theory. There is no reason to assume that theories about the
mental states of others are caught in the analogous dilemma of
behaviorism or skepticism.
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V
Current use of the term 'behavior' is very broad indeed.
Facial expressions, the use of language, manifestations of
neurological disorders, biologically innate reflexes, intentional
actions, et al., are all said to be 'behavior'. Understanding this
imprecise and sweeping usage may be more of a sociological task
than a philosophical one. But there is, I think, a philosophical
confusion lurking within this strange fascination with 'behavior'.
When philosophers speak of behavior in the context of the problem
of other minds, they seem to mean 'behavior-and-thus-not-mental-
state'. Skeptics often say, in effect, that all behavior is obser-
vable, whereas what is truly a mental state is not. I have objected
to this sort of view on several grounds. Now I wish to focus on the
(often tacit) claim that all the behavioral states of persons can be
considered physical states (as opposed to mental states) and as
such observable. The skeptical-analogical portrait of mental
states seems to say that the problem of intersubjective observation
begins abruptly with the specially mental states, and that all other
features of persons can be considered observable because they are
physical features. That is, I have previously objected to the
skeptical analogical view because it falsified the nature of mental
states. Now I wish to argue that the very same separation of
features into mental and physical obscures or falsifies the nature
of all those features of persons which are lumped together under
the title of 'behavior'.
To begin somewhere close to the beginning again, let us
remember that the other minds skeptic asserts that there is an
epistemic problem about the mental states of others which does
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not apply equally to their physical states. Skeptics now make
it fairly clear that by 'mental state' they have in mind something
quite special. But they are not at all careful when they consider
the notion of physical state. The first problem is that it is
simply not at all clear what counts as a physical state of a person.
Certain features certainly are, such as physical dimensions or
the color of the skin. As a general rule, one might say that those
properties which are truly predictable of thoroughly inanimate
objects as well as persons are clearly physical properties.
Skeptics imply that all those features they consider genuinely
behavioral or simply behavioral are safely physical. (Certain
states which are undeniably behavioral are also undeniably
mentalistic. For example, 'S is writhing in pain' describes S's
behavior; but the statement surely entails that S feels pain. The
skeptical view seems to be that such a state is not genuinely or
not simply behavioral, because it entails the presence of a mental
state. The skeptic will surely argue that this state is, like the
predicate which ascribes it, a compound one, composed of be-
havioral and mental parts. 'S is writhing in pain' is true if and
only if 'S is writhing' and 'S is in pain' are true. The skeptic
will assert that only '... is writing' is a genuine or simple
behavioral predicate. This position is eminently plausible in the
case described, and in similar etiological ones like the case of
'jump for joy'. We shall see, however, that the skeptic tries, in
effect, to extend this analysis to states and predicates which are
not obviously compound, like 'smiling' or 'pointing'. It is with
these that serious problems arise for the skeptical view. )
The skeptic says (roughly) that there is no relevant epistemic
problem with the ordinary physical features, no problem with the
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genuinely behavioral features, but that there is a very definite
problem with the mental features or states. It is, however, not
at all obvious that the behavioral states are as transparent as
skeptics present them; that, for example, it is only with mental
states that problems of observation begin. In the previous section
I tried to argue that it does make sense to say that we can observe
the mental states of others. The skeptic questions this. But now
I want to pose the obverse question for the skeptic. If we accept
his arguments about observation, can it really be said that we
observe the behavior of others ?
We must be careful here to speak of properties or states or
predicates, and not events. A person's behaving in a certain way
can be truly described in a variety of ways, and there appear to
be important differences among some of these descriptions. It
is certainly a very plausible thesis that one and the same event
may be described as 'eating' or as 'flexing muscles A, B, and C';
or that one behavioral episode may be described as 'writhing in
pain' or simply as 'writhing'. Every behavioral episode has,
presumably, a physiological description. But this is hardly
sufficient to show that behavior is physical in the strong sense
implied in the skeptical-analogical view. For what is obviously
meant there is that the relevant predicates (or properties) of
behavior are physical predicates (or properties). And this is a
difficult claim. I shall attempt to show that it is false.
Certain states of persons are clearly physical states, e.g.,
having a broken leg. Other states are clearly mental, e. g.,
believing that p. But between these two extremes lie the vast
number of states that characterize what people (or their bodies)
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do. It is not at all obvious at all that these states are physical
ones. For example, when we say that someone is waiting, are
we ascribing a physical state or a mental state (or neither)?
One is tempted to say that waiting entails expecting, and that
expecting is a mental state. Yet we normally think we can observe
that someone or something is waiting. Should we conclude that
we can obsdrve that something is expecting that p? The skeptic
will certainly say No, and try to drive a wedge between the
mentalistic and physical parts of these states. It could easily be
argued that we observe the cat's sitting in front of the mouse hole,
but not the intentions, desires, or beliefs that make such an act
a waiting for something. But the problem with this is that what
remains observable in behavior is considerably less than we
commonly think and considerably less than what skeptics suggest
when they claim that behavior is observable, but mental states not.
Some behavioral predicates (and, one assumes, the states
they describe) are mentalistic: 'reach for', 'look for', 'point to',
'wait for', etc. are all intentional, just as 'desire that p' or 'hope
that p' are. With intentional mental states, like desire, the
skeptical case is at its weakest, for introspection is irrelevant
and privacy claims are false for such states. But now intentional
behavioral states present the obverse problem for the skeptic:
if they are considered physical, one wonders how they could be
intentional; if they are mental, one wonders how they could be
observable. To take the first course seems foolish, for one would
have to drive the mental/physical wedge between, say 'expect' and
'wait'; and would still have to explain how it was that intentionality,
which many have taken to be the mark of the mental, spans the gap.
12 7
The second option is more in the spirit of the skeptical position,
but it too, is not easy. For, say, when you point to something,
it certainly seems that we see or observe your pointing. But the
skeptic should find this way of speaking false or deceptive, else
he will have to admit that we can observe someone's being in an
intentional state; and if he admits that, it is hard to see why we
couldn't be said to see someone's being in a clearly mental inten-
tional state, such as hope. It would seem that the skeptic will
have to say that we do not really observe someone's pointing, but
that we observe the muscular movement which has been done with
a certain intention. We observe the muscular movement, but not
the intention with which it is done.
The same considerations will apparently have to apply with
non-intentional predicates and states as well. Things like smiles
and frowns cannot really be observable either; for when someone
frowns (in a genuine way, in the appropriate situation), we take it
that they are displeased or distressed. 5 We certainly seem to see
the person's mood in their frown; but the skeptic will have none of
this. He might argue that just as someone from a foreign culture
will surely observe something, yet not see the mood in the frown,
so in epistemological reconstruction we must distinguish the
frowning expression from the mood which causes it. He will want
to say that the frown per se, the muscular motion is all we truly
observe. Meaning, mood, or motive must be leached from what
we can be said to observe. The skeptic should say something like
"You think you see the animation of the body. But it could be a
manniken or a robot. So all you are really entitled to say is that
you observe 'frown-like expressions' and 'pointing-like gestures'
and the like. The animation you think you see in the gestures,
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expressions and actions is there only by dint of what your own
mind contributes to what it truly does observe. "
Thus what the skeptic really wants to say is not that we
observe behavior (and not mental state) but rather that we observe
behavior if we take a restricted set of descriptions of behavior as
our observation predicates. It is not just mental states which
are unobservable, but also the animation of behavior itself. The
skeptical-analogical portrait of the mental is not just a theory
about mental states, but also a theory about behavior as well.
Not only does it give us an odd view of mental states, it gives us
a correlatively odd view of behavior as well. Our experience of
animation is denied, and only a limited set of behavioral predi-
cates is permitted. Apparently innocuous statements like 'His
face was tense' must be denied observational status. Thus when
skeptic or analogist says we observe "outward demeanor" or be-
havior, he must mean it in a severely restricted sense. When
the skeptic says 'behavior' he does not mean behavior as we
ordinarily experience and describe it, but behavior in a much
more narrow sense indeed, one in which only physical, physio-
logical or anatomical descriptions count as observational.
But now a rather interesting connection can be brought to
light. If the skeptic or analogist will accept only such weak
predicates of behavior as observation predicates, then this con-
straint on the technical sense of 'observe' is just another way of
putting the traditional behaviorist constraint on the genuine, un-
empathic description of behavior. The skeptical observation
predicates correspond to the 'genuinely scientific' predicates of
psychological theory. Skinner states:
129
The independent variables must . . . be described
in physical terms. An effort is often made to avoid
the labor of analysing a physical situation by guessing
what it 'means' to an organism or by distinguishing
between the physical world and a psychological world
of 'experience'. The events affecting an organism
must be capable of description in the language of physical
science.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 36)
Hull suggested
An ideally adequate theory even of so-called purposive
behavior ought, therefore, to begin with colorless
movement and mere receptor impulses as such, and
from these build up step by step both adaptive and mal-
adaptive behavior.
(Hull, 1943, p. 25)
These goals require that we eschew our ordinary predicates of
behavior in favor of predicates, which, like the ones needed by
Mill and Plantinga, are mentality neutral in a strict sense.
Under the condition of using a stern behavioristic language, in
which the only permissable observation predicates are Hull's
terms of "~colorless movement", one would not be able to tell by
observation that another creature was in pain, nor that it was
waiting, nor even that it was smiling.
Skepticism, the analogical position, and behaviorism all
suppose or argue that the mentalistic descriptions of animate
behavior are not among the genuine or objective descriptions of
behavior. What is truly observable is bodily movement or "outward
demeanor" in a narrow sense. Now I am not claiming that all
skeptics and analogists are behaviorists, nor am I trying simply
to discredit their arguments by linking them to behaviorist ones.
The arguments familiar in other minds discussion are generally
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different from those employed by behaviorists. 6 The moral I
hope to draw is a larger one, that behaviorists and skeptics are
barking up the wrong tree, albeit from different sides. 7
Skeptical and behaviorist arguments revolve around, and attempt
to refine, the vaguely formed distinction between mental and physical
phenomena. Our ordinary experience and descriptions of behavior
pose a problem for both programs; for animate behavior resists easy
classification in either category. The behaviorists attempted to
deflate animate behavior, to show that its differences from inanimate
motion are thoretically insignificant, through the rigidly physicalistic
analysis of mentalistic predicates and stimulus-response accounts
of behavior itself. The skeptic or analogist has to be equally hard
with animate behavior. Arguments about the epistemologically
rigorous use of 'observe' and 'observe that' are directed to this same
end, to showing that what we are entitled to claim about behavior and
about the animation of behavior is much less than our ordinary ex-
perience of other persons leads us to believe. Behaviorism and
skepticism may disagree about the status to be accorded to conscious
experience, but they agree in claiming that what we can truly be said
to know about behavior is what can be said in physicalistic terms.
Both behaviorism and skepticism err, I suggest, in so thinking.
Their common error is their belief that such descriptions are
forthcoming and..hence that animate behavior will cease to be re-
sistant to the mental/'physical distinction.
The skeptic attempts to force his claim that we cannot
observe the mental states of others by insisting that we only see
the behavior of others. He tries to use this distinction, for
example, to force the Strawsonian view (p. 118, above) to choose
between logical behaviorism and skepticism about the mental
states of others. But the skeptic has trapped himself instead.
He has forced himself to adopt behavioristic constraints on the
permissible descriptions of behavior. If you take 'behavior'
in this sense, of course you don't observe any mentality at all.
But if we don't take 'behavior' in this sense, we can say that we
certainly do observe mentality, or animation, in behavior. There
is nothing mysterious in the idea that we truly observe animate
behavior. The skeptic wanted us to say we only observe the be-
havior, not the animation. But he must say we do not even ob-
serve the behavior in the sense in which we ordinarily do. The
behavior /mental state choice can be forced upon us only by
forcing on us first a strange and dubious doctrine about behavior
itself, and about the observation of behavior of others. In trying
to show we cannot observe the mental states of other persons the
skeptic seems to require that we cannot observe that the behavior
of others is animate. There is so little reason for accepting this
last claim, I think we can put a dilemma to the skeptic: if we
don't observe the mental states of others, we don't observe their
behavior (in the normal sense of the term) either.
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Footnotes
1. It is sometimes said that such mental states are more properly
called 'mental events', 'states' being reserved for things like
intentions which one may have while asleep, or when not thinking
about them. I wish, however, to use the term 'mental state'
in a broader way, such that it is a cover term for all the events,
states or processes we call 'mental'.
2. Plantinga uses (7), whereas Don Locke (1968) uses (8) and
explicitly denies (7). Ayer (1953) seems to believe both (7)
and (8).
3. That this is Plantinga's position is not immediately apparent
from his text. He does not so much argue for the acceptance
of this technical sense of 'observe that' as present cases for
our intuitive consideration:
... in a perfectly ordinary sense of 'see that'
one may properly claim to see that someone else
is in pain. In the same or a similar use, one
can see that a child has measles, that a pipe will
give a sweet smoke, and that electrons of a
certain sort are sporting in the cloud chamber.
In a similar use of the term, the theist, impressed
by the harmony and beauty of the universe or the
profundity of the scripture may justifiably (even if
mistakenly) claim to see that God exists.
(Plantinga, p. 189)
4. Ryle suggested this long ago. Cf. (Ryle, 1949), pp. 201-220.
5. The fact that we are sometimes wrong shows very little indeed.
We are often wrong about physical objects and their properties.
And it is surely an error to infer from this that we don't ever
see them.
6. There is occasionally overlap. Plantinga, for example, may
have fallen into the trap of thinking that the ascription of
mentalistic predicates compromises the claim that all events
are physical events.
7. As is well known, behaviorism first arose at a time when
various forms of introspectionism were considered valid
methods of psychology, and sometimes considered the only
valid methods in psychology. The behaviorists wanted, or
can be interpreted as having wanted an intersubjective
method for obtaining objective and intersubjectively valid
knowledge about the mind. Such objectivity is impossible
if mental states are knowable only by the person who has
them. Or rather: if there is no intersubjective way of
studying mental states, there will be as many psychologies
as there are persons--or more precisely, we will have no
way of determining if the results of my introspection match
with yours so that mental state types can be known to apply
to different persons. In response to this problem the be-
haviorists insisted that the only way to achieve objectivity
in psychology was to study behavior in a rigidly physicalistic
way. (This interpretation of behaviorism as a worry over
methodological solipsism, and its relevance to the other
minds problem is not new. Kohler explicitly states it in
his Gestalt Psychology, Chapter I. ) If behaviorism was,
in part, an attempt to find an intersubjective basis for the
study of mind, the historical irony is that the insistence on
physical or physiological descriptions of behavior reinstituted
the introspectionist idea that a mental state was an intro-
spectable item of consciousness, radically different from the
behavioral manifestations.
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